Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy by Jacoby, Melissa B. & Holman, Mirya
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2010
Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy
Melissa B. Jacoby
University of North Carolina School of Law, mjacoby@email.unc.edu
Mirya Holman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
ARTICLES 
Managing Medical Bills on the Brink of Bankruptcy 
Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman• 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 240
II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY ......................................................... 244
A. MANAGING OUT-OF-POCKET LIABILITY ................................................... 244 
1. IN GENERAL ..... ·············· ...... ····· ............................. ················ ............ 244
2. MEASURING MEDICAL BURDENS OF BANKRUPTCY FILERS .............. 257 
B. DATA FOR THE CURRENT STUDY ............................................................... 262 
III. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS .......................................................................... 265
IV. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................ 286
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 288
• Jacoby is the George R. Ward Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill School of Law and Visiting Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School (2009-2010). Holman is
an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Florida Atlantic University. For helpful comments on
prior drafts, thanks to Scott Baker, Frederic Bloom, Al Brophy, Elizabeth Gibson, Mark Hall, Jim
Hawkins, Jill Horwitz, Edward Janger, Timothy Jost, Joan Krause, Kimberly Krawiec, Robert
Lawless, Bill Marshall, Christopher Robertson, Mark Rukavina, Richard Saver, Sidney Watson,
and those who offered feedback at workshops, panel discussions, and colloquia at American
University Washington College of Law, Brooklyn Law School, Duke University Law School,
Georgia State College of Law, UNC School of Law, and the Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard Law
School. Thanks to UNC for financial support of this project, to Tram Rattanavong, John
Fitzpatrick, Louis Massard, Jabeen Ahmad, and Rachel Lerner for research assistance, and to Nick
Sexton, Julie Kimbrough, and Dean Smith for library assistance. This paper analyzes data from the
2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project ("2007 CBP"). The principal investigators of the 2007 CBP are
David Himmelstein, Melissa Jacoby, Robert Lawless, Angela Littwin, Katherine Porter, John
Pottow, Teresa Sullivan, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, and Steffie Woolhandler. The 2007
CBP received external funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the AARP, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). None of the funders or other principal investigators
is responsible for the analysis reported here.
239 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEAL TH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS X:2 (2010) 
Medical men who frequently go to law to recover fees generally lose more in 
the end than they gain; not only because such attempts to recover often prove 
fruitless, but because they excite prejudice and make influential enemies. 
DANIEL WEBSTER CATHELL, THE PHYSICIAN HIMSELF FROM GRADUATION TO 
OLD AGE 292 (1925). 
I. INTRODUCTION
In the vast majority of health care interactions, patients in the United States­
regardless of their insurance status-bear some direct financial liability to medical 
providers.' Whether they are not-for-profit hospitals or for-profit small 
businesses, health care providers cannot be indifferent to the collection of these 
obligations. Consultants in medical practice management have developed and 
marketed extensive advice for structuring all aspects of providers' interactions 
with patients to mimic commercial transactions in other retail service contexts.2 
This advice, if successful, shields providers from the public scrutiny of after-the­
fact debt collection through lawsuits and liens. 3
Medical practice management affects the study of the financial burden 
imposed by health care. In recent years, lawmakers and scholars have debated the 
role of medical problems in fueling personal bankruptcy filings. Some scholars 
measure medical-related bankruptcy using survey techniques. Skeptics of survey­
based findings often cite studies of bankruptcy court records that yield more 
conservative estimates. Court record studies look for evidence of claims by 
creditors with medical identities in the documents that bankruptcy filers submit 
to the court. 
A clash over these methods arose directly prior to the passage of the 
1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See, e.g., Anna Wilde Matthews, Beyond Co-Pay: Surprise Bills at the Doctor's; To Ensure
They Get Paid, Doctors Seek Entire Bill for Patient Share Upfront, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at 
DI (citing a doctor reporting that office staff had to train patients to see doctor visits like a trip to 
Walmart-"pay before leaving"). 
3. For scrutiny of that debt collection, see, for example, Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider,
Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REv. 
643 (2007); George A. Nation, III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and 
Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L. J. 101 (2005). 
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Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.4 This bill 
was the most significant set of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in a 
generation and substantially restricted debt relief for individual filers. Lawmakers 
who opposed the bankruptcy bill cited a 2005 study by Himmelstein, Thome, 
Warren, and Woolhandler finding that approximately half of bankruptcies were 
medical-related.5 Supporters of the bankruptcy bill countered with a court record 
analysis conducted within the Department of Justice (DOJ). According to the 
DOJ analysis, over half of the sample (54%) had no medical debt at all, the 
average medical debt among those with any such debt was under $5,000, and 
medical debt comprised only 5.5% of the total unsecured debt of the sample.6 
More recently, debates about health care finance intensified public interest in the 
financial impact of medical bills and these methodological disputes. In the 
summer of 2009, Himmelstein et al. reported that 62% of personal bankruptcies 
could be construed as medical-related.7 President Obama used medical 
bankruptcy rates as a rationale for health care reform. 8 Lawmakers held hearings 
on whether the current health care system is bankrupting American families. At 
one such hearing in July 2009, Representative John Conyers cited the 
4. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
5. See infra Part 11.A.2. 
6. See infra p. 265, tbl.l. 
7. David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffie Woolhandler, Medical 
Bankrnptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 742 
(2009). 
8. President Obama cited the Himmelstein study during his campaign and has continued to 
reference the connection between medical bills and bankruptcy in statements to Congress. See 
BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN'S PLAN To LOWER HEALTH CARE COSTS AND ENSURE 
AFFORDABLE, ACCESSIBLE HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL I, 1 (2008), http://www.barackobama.com/ 
pdf/issues/HealthCareFul!Plan.pdf ("Over half of all personal bankruptcies today are caused by 
medical bills."). ln an address to a joint session of Congress in early 2009, the President stated that 
"the crushing cost of health care ... is a cost that now causes a bankruptcy in America every thirty 
seconds." President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009), 
available at http://www.whiteh9use.gov/the _press_ office/remarks-of-president-barack-obama-
address-to-joint-session-of-congress. "In a letter to Democratic Senate leaders . . . the President 
said: 'Health-care reform is not a luxury .... [S]piraling premiums and out-of-pocket expenses are 
pushing [families] into bankruptcy and forcing them to go without the checkups and prescriptions 
they need."' Catherine Arnst, Study Links Medical Costs and Personal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS WEEK, June 4, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/ 
dnflash/content/jun2009/db2009064 _ 666715.htm. 
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Himmelstein study as evidence that health care reform was urgently needed. 9 But 
a scholar from the American Enterprise Institute countered by citing the earlier 
DOJ court record analysis and its more modest assessment of the role of medical 
debt in bankruptcy.10 
Here, we provide the first attempt to reconcile these competing methods of 
measuring medical burden, applying both the survey method and court record 
method to the same set of filers in a single dataset. Our dataset, the 2007 
Consumer Bankruptcy Project ("2007 CBP"), is a nationally representative 
sample of people who filed for bankruptcy in early 2007. This dataset consists of 
hundreds of variables from court records, questionnaires, and telephone 
interviews. It was compiled by professors of law, medicine, and sociology at 
seven major research universities, including one of the authors of this Article. 
The court record medical debt in our sample is patterned very consistently 
with the earlier DOJ sample. Someone who used the DOJ analysis to suggest that 
medical bills were not a problem in bankruptcy presumably would be nearly as 
happy to cite the court record analysis of our dataset. 
However, when we compare the court record method and survey method as 
applied to the same dataset, court records routinely reflect smaller or even zero 
medical obligations for filers who report out-of-pocket expenses on the 
questionnaire. Indeed, one out of four respondents who explicitly reported 
medical bills as a reason for filing for bankruptcy has court records with zero 
identifiable medical debt. 
After exploring several theories for these discrepancies, we observe that the 
deviations are quite consistent with filers' medical bill management. In other 
words, due to credit use, the court record method is incapable of capturing some 
of the most significant medical obligations incurred before bankruptcy. For 
example, respondents who reported significant out-of-pocket expenses, but had 
little or no detectable medical debt in their court records, reported credit card and 
mortgage use for medical bills at significantly higher rates than other 
respondents. 11 Respondents who specifically cited medical bills as a reason for 
filing for bankruptcy mortgaged their homes to pay medical bills at nearly four 
9. See Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
4 (July 28, 2009) (opening statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Conyers090728.pdf. 
JO. See id. at IO (written testimony of Apama Mathur, Research Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mathur090728.pdf. 
11. See infra p. 276, fig.4. 
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times the frequency of other filers. 12 They also were more than a third more likely 
than other filers to use credit cards for medical bills. 13 These mortgages and 
credit card bills are invisible in the court record method because they bear no 
sign of medical identity. Thus, the court record method, by itself, produces an 
estimate of medical burden that is not merely more conservative across the board, 
but skewed. 
The distortion in the court record method does not seem to apply to all 
demographic groups uniformly, probably due to factors we cannot directly 
measure, such as access to credit and access to health care. Thus, interesting 
patterns emerge when we disaggregate our national sample on the basis of age, 
race, sex, and housing tenure. Court records make some filers appear as if they 
had incurred distinctively high medical debt because they were less likely to use 
credit cards or mortgages for medical bills. For similar reasons, other groups of 
filers have quite similar medical debts in the court records even though they 
incurred very different amounts of medical obligation prior to filing. Again, 
significant variations in medical debt management alter the picture the court 
records provide. 
The findings reveal the problems with relying exclusively on court records 
to measure the financial impact of medical care. They also provide another 
perspective on the financial end of medical practice with which this article began. 
As previously noted, non-legal writings advise how medical providers should 
manage the risk of transacting with patients, in part because these writers have 
long feared that patients will put doctors at the bottom of the priority list of bills 
to pay. 14 The respondents in the current study often were facing financial 
difficulties when they sought medical care. 15 Yet, by the time they filed for 
bankruptcy, respondents had considerably reduced providers' direct financial 
exposure. This suggests that even patients with modest incomes and high debt-to-
income ratios feel a sense of responsibility to their doctors. Alternatively, they 
are responding to providers' encouragements to reduce their direct liability. 
12. See infra p. 274, fig.3. 
13. Id. 
14. See, e.g., DANIEL WEBSTER CATHELL, THE PHYSICIAN HIMSELF FROM GRADUATION TO OLD 
AGE 292 (1925). See also sources cited irifra Part IV. 
15. In telephone interviews with a large subset of respondents in our sample, 44% reported 
that they had seriously struggled financially for more than two years before filing for bankruptcy. 
An additional 27% reported serious struggling for more than one year. We do not have this 
information for all respondents in the sample, but the telephone survey subsample is not 
significantly different from the whole regarding variables such as filing status, chapter, total assets, 
total debts, priority debts, monthly income, and home value. See infra text accompanying note 100. 
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This Article proceeds with the following Parts. Part II.A offers background 
on out-of-pocket medical bills and medical practice management advice. It then 
contextualizes our study by reviewing the methodological and political dispute 
over measuring medical burden among bankruptcy filers. Part II.B describes our 
dataset, giving special attention to the new questions and variables that enabled 
this study. Part III reports our findings. Part IV highlights some implications of 
our study for understanding the burden of health care spending on families and 
medical practice management. 
II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY
A. Managing Out-of-Pocket Liability
1. In General
For many reasons, today's health care finance system expressly imposes 
cost-sharing and direct patient liability on patients who are covered by health 
insurance. 16 According to The Coker Group, a health care industry consultant 
firm, 90% of patients owe money directly at the time of service. 17 Furthermore, 
16. See generally PAUL B. GINSBURG, ROBERT WOOD JOJ-INSON FOUND., HIGH AND RISING
HEALTH CARE COSTS: DEMYSTIFYING U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING 19 (2008), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/ l O 1508. policysynthesis.costdrivers.rpt. pdf ( discussing consumer 
financial exposure as a method of controlling health care spending on low-value new technologies, 
assuming consumers have sufficient information); JONATHAN GRUBER, KAISER FAM. FOUND., THE 
ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND l (2006) (describing cost-sharing and reporting impact on 
utilization and health outcomes); MILLIMAN, 2008 MILLIMAN MEDICAL INDEX 9 (2008) (of the 
"$15,609 total medical cost for a family of four under a PPO ... the employee pays about $6,167," 
$2,675 of which is paid in cost-sharing at time of service); McKinsey & Company, Why Americans 
Pay More for Health Care, MCKINSEY Q., Dec. 2008, at 9 (noting that the "average" health care 
consumer pays 12% of the total cost directly out-of-pocket, in addition to 25% of the premium 
cost); Kaiser Fam. Found., Snapshots: Health Care Costs: Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Spending 
for Health Care Services, May 2006, http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm050206oth.cfm 
(noting that the average share paid out-of-pocket by non-elderly people with private insurance and 
any health spending in 2003 was 34%); Ann Kjos, New Prospects for Payment Card Application in 
Health Care, Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper l (Nov. 
2008), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion­
papers/2008/ D2008NovemberHealthCareCardApplication.pdf ("[O]ut-of-pocket expenditures, 
which consumers pay directly to medical service providers, are not insignificant and are expected 
to grow from the current level of about $269 billion."). 
17. THE COKER GROUP, MAXIMIZING BILLING AND COLLECTIONS IN THE MEDICAL PRACTICE 41
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obligations to be collected directly from patients represent, on average, 15-20% 
of a medical provider's receivables. 18 At least prior to the enactment of health 
care finance reform, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services predicted 
continued increases in patient out-of-pocket payments. 19 In an analysis of a 
recent Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the authors reported that a fifth of 
privately insured non-elderly families had out-of-pocket obligations exceeding 
5% of their incomes.20 
As an interesting sign of the times regarding direct medical obligations, a 
few years ago a bank started issuing a "Healthcare Visa Gift Card."21 The 
website for the Visa card lists a variety of occasions for which such a gift might 
be appropriate.22 Although new card orders are no longer being taken, the vendor 
of the cards called them a "hot new Christmas gift."23 Gift-givers could get the 
card in amounts ranging from $25 to $5,000, and using the card would be fee-
free for the recipient for eight months, after which the recipient would pay a 
monthly maintenance fee of $1.50.24 Existing cards may be used for health club 
membership and totally elective surgery as well as for dental care and co-pays at 
doctors' offices.25 
Certainly many people with modest out-of-pocket obligations or higher 
(2007). 
18. Mitch Patridge & Doug Barry, Compassionate Patient Financing Can Cure a Hospital's 
Financial Jlls, 32 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 168, 171 (2006); Richard Haugh, Financial Aid: From 
Direct Debits to New Loans, Patients Get New Ways To Pay Off Hospital Bills, HOSP. & HEALTH 
NETWORKS, Nov. 2006, at 18. Patridge and Barry note that these receivables represent only 2-5% of 
net revenue due to insufficient collection practices. See Patridge & Barry, supra. 
19. See Christopher J. Troffer et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2019: The 
Recession's lmpact Continues, 29 HEALTH AFF. 522, 526 (2010) (noting a 4.8% average annual 
percentage growth for out-of-pocket payments over the projection period 2009-2019). 
20. See GRUBER, supra note 16, at 11. This excludes insurance premiums. See, e.g., DIDEM 
BERNARD & JESSICA BANTH!N, MED. EXPENDITURE PANEL SURV., FAMILY-LEVEL EXPENDITURES ON 
HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS AMONG THE U.S. NONELDERLY POPULATION, 2004, 14, 15 
(2007) (defining terms used in MEPS surveys). 
21. See Givewell.com, Where To Use It, http://www.givewell.com/where-to-use (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2010) ("Promote happiness, give a Healthcare Visa Gift Card"). 
22. See Givewell.com, Occasions To Give, http://www.givewell.com/occasions-to-give (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
23. Medical Gift Cards Trendy, HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, 
N.Y.), Feb. 2008, at 11. 
24. See Givewell.com, How It Works, http://www.givewell.com/how-it-works/ (last visited 
April 2, 2010). 
25.Jd. 
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incomes pay immediately and without serious consequence. But contemporary 
studies continue to report that cost-sharing results in delinquent medical debt 
with some prevalence,26 even for routine care.27 Nationally representative studies 
estimate that tens of millions of households have accrued medical debt and/or 
have problems paying medical bills.28 Concerns about medical debt are 
longstanding and have transcended the evolution of health care finance. 29 
26. Many published papers and unpublished online policy briefs make this point. For recent 
examples, see ANDREW COHEN & CAROL PRYOR, IN DEBT BUT NOT INDIFFERENT: CHAPTER 58 AND 
THE ACCESS PROJECT'S MEDICAL DEBT RESOLUTION PROGRAM (2008), available at 
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/lnDebtButNotindifferent.pdf; SIDNEY D. WATSON ET AL., 
LIVING IN THE RED: MEDICAL DEBT AND HOUSING SECURITY IN MISSOURI (2007), available at 
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/living_in_the_red.pdf; Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are 
Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and 2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298, w304 tbl.4 
(2008) (reporting that increasingly significant proportions of insured population pay out-of-pocket). 
27. See, e.g., PAUL FRONSTIN & SARA R. COLLINS, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 
FINDINGS FROM THE 2007 EBRUCOMMONWEALTH FUND CONSUMERISM IN HEALTH SURVEY 9-10 
(2008); WILLIAM LOTTERO ET AL., LOSING GROUND: ERODING HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
LEA YES KANSAS FARMERS WITH MEDICAL DEBT IO (2006), available at 
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/losing_ground.pdf (nearly 60% with medical debt reported 
owing money for routine care); Jessica S. Banthin, Peter Cunningham & Didem M. Bernard, 
Financial Burden of Health Care, 2001-2004, 27 HEALTH AFF. 188 (2008) (studying out-of-pocket 
obligations plus premium costs across population); PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, CAROLYN MILLER & 
ALWYN CASSIL, LIVING ON THE EDGE: HEALTH CARE EXPENSES STRAIN FAMILY BUDGETS 3 (Ctr. for 
Studying Health Sys. Change, Res. Brief No. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/l034/l034.pdf (explaining how trouble paying medical bills 
can result from non-catastrophic expenses). 
28. In a Commonwealth Fund study, 72 million "working age" people and an additional 7 
million over 65 had accrued medical debt and/or problems paying medical bills, an increase over 
earlier studies. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., LOSING GROUND: How THE Loss OF ADEQUATE 
HEAL TH INSURANCE Is BURDENING WORKING FAMILIES: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEAL TH FUND 
BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEYS, 2001-2007, vii (Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief, 2008), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2008/Aug/ 
Losing-Ground--How-the-Loss-of-Adequate-Health-Insurance-Is-Burdening-Working-Families--
8212-F inding.aspx; see also Schoen et al., supra note 26 (reporting 16% were contacted by debt 
collectors about medical bills). In another study, 57 million people in 2007 (14 million more than in 
2003) were in households with trouble paying medical bills. PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, TRADE-OFFS 
GETTING TOUGHER: PROBLEMS PAYING MEDICAL BILLS INCREASE FOR U.S. FAMILIES 2003-2007, 1 
(Center for Studying Health Sys. Change, Tracking Rep. No. 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/l 017/1017.pdf. 
29. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, This Won't Hurt a Bit: Health Care Reform/or Dummies, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 2009, at 18 (reporting on the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care from the 
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MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS 
Health policy researchers and patient advocates have articulated specific 
worries about how medical debt affects patients and their families. Prominent 
examples of such worries include the following: patients may self-ration 
medically necessary care and drugs;30 medical providers may deny non-
emergency care;31 patients may self-ration important nan-medical expenses;32 
providers or their designees may engage in harsh formal debt collection 
activity;33 patients may experience adverse psychological consequences from fear 
about medical debt that in turn may aggravate health conditions;34 certain 
demographic groups may be disproportionately impacted by cost-related or debt-
related access problems;35 and patients may experience pressures to convert 
1930s and the concern that medical bills destabilize household finances); Editorial, Most People 
Need No Aid To Pay the Doctor's Bill, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. IO, 1953, at 10, 12 (arguing 
that U.S. News story was an overreaction to data from academic study); Special Report: Doctor 
Bills Pile Up: How Can Families Pay?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1952, at 65-70 
(reporting on academic study finding that one in five families had outstanding medical debt). 
30. This point is frequently made. For a few recent entries to the literature, see, for example, 
PETER J. CUNNINGHAM & LAURIE E. FELLAND, FALLING BEHIND: AMERICANS' ACCESS TO MEDICAL 
CARE DETERIORATES, 2003-2007, 2 (Center for Studying Health Sys. Change, Tracking Rep. No. 
19, 2008), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/993/993.pdf (noting cost was "most 
frequently cited-and growing--obstacle to care"); Cathy Schoen et al., In Chronic Condition: 
Experiences of Patients with Complex Health Care Needs, in Eight Countries, 2008, 28 HEALTH 
AFF. wl, w5 (2008) (discussing cost-related deterrence of treatment, particularly among U.S. 
patients); Robert W. Seifert & Mark Rukavina, Bankruptcy Is the Tip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg, 
25 HEALTH AFF. w89, w90 (2006). 
31. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 3 ("In 2007, about l O percent of people with 
medical bill problems reported being denied care by medical providers directly as a result of their 
medical bill problems."). 
32. See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 27, at 4-5 (discussing families who are late on 
mortgages and cut down other expenses due to medical bill problems); id. at 8 (discussing choice 
between medical bills and keeping children housed and fed); Robert W. Seifert, Home Sick: How 
Medical Debt Undermines Housing Security, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 325 (2007). 
33. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An 
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, JOO Nw. U. L. REv. 535 (2006) 
( documenting concerns of patient advocates). 
34. See, e.g., CAROL PRYOR, ANDREW COHEN & JEFFREY PROTTAS, THE ILLUSION OF 
COVERAGE 9 (2007), available at http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/the_illusion_of_courage.pdf; 
Wilhelmine Miller, Elizabeth Richardson Vidgor & Willard G. Manning, Covering the Uninsured: 
What Is It Worth?, HEALTH AFF. W4-157, W4-162 (Web Exclusive Mar. 2004) ("The social stigma 
and psychological stresses of medical indigency, health care debt, and bill collection efforts are 
themselves burdensome."). 
35. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. PATCHIAS & JUDITH WAXMAN, WOMEN AND HEALTH COVERAGE: 
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medical debt into third-party credit that could substantially increase the size of 
those bills and other consequences.36 
The world looks different from the perspective of the medical practice 
management field. As the following paragraphs will illustrate, writers in this field 
focus on protecting health care providers, rather than patients, from unpaid debt. 
While scholars from many disciplines continue to debate whether medical care 
should be treated as an ordinary commodity,37 those on the front lines of practical 
THE AFFORDABILITY GAP 5-6 (Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief, 2007), available at 
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/NWLCCommonwealthHealthinsurancelssueBrief2007.pdf (reporting on 
medical debt among people with health insurance). 
36. See, e.g., SARA COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE AFFORDABILITY CRISIS IN 
HEALTH CARE: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY 
32 (2004 ), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr _ doc/collins _ biennial2003 _ 723 .pdf 
(one in five medical debtors had large credit card debt or home mortgage to pay medical bills); 
DEMOS & CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LEARNING, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND DEBT 
IN AMERICA 56-57 (2005), available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/PSN_low.pdf (reporting that 
medical bills contributed to credit card debt for 29% of low and middle income households); NAT'L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNHEALTHY PURSUITS: How THE SICK AND VULNERABLE ARE HARMED BY 
ABUSIVE MEDICAL COLLECTION TACTICS, 36 (2005), available at 
http://www.consumerlaw.org/news/content/medicaldebt.pdf (suggesting that providers have 
encouraged patients to take on high-cost credit for bills); CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA, 
BORROWING TO STAY HEALTHY: How CREDIT CARD DEBT Is RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 
(2007), available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/healthy _ web.pdf; Cunningham et al., supra note 
27 (giving examples of credit card, mortgages, and personal loan use for medical bills); Brian Grow 
& Robert Bemer, Fresh Pain for the Uninsured: As Doctors and Hospitals Turn to GE, Citigroup, 
and Smaller Rivals To Finance Patient Care, the Sick Pay Much More, Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 2007, at 
34 (reporting on loan arranging for bills of patients who were unaware of the third-party 
arrangement); USA Today/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, Health 
Care Costs Survey, Summary and Chartpack, Chart 3 (Aug. 2005), available at 
http://www.kff.org/newsmedia/upload/7371.pdf (reporting that 8% borrowed money or got second 
mortgages because of problems with paying medical bills). In a recent tracking survey, about one in 
ten respondents with problems paying medical bills reported that their providers suggested that they 
take out loans to meet their health care obligations. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28. Two national 
publications recently cited Senator Grassley's concern that medical providers are "cozying up to 
banks, debt buyers, and credit card companies over patients' medical bills." Grow & Bemer, supra, 
at 34 (quoting a statement that Senator Grassley provided to Business Week); Overdose of Debt: 
Lenders Push Risky Credit for Everything from Cancer Care to Botox, CONSUMER REPS., July 
2008, at 14, 18 (reporting the same statement). 
37. Philip E. Tetlock, Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political 
Implications, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 251 
(Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) ("Liberals view the buying and selling of conventional medical 
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advice to providers largely proceed from the assumption of commercial 
exchange.38 For the most part, a report published by the American Medical 
Association strongly emphasizes this theme, reminding doctors, "It's your 
money-ask for it!"39 
Medical practice management writings instruct providers on such matters as: 
how to get payments up front (including before services are rendered);40 how to 
services and, to some degree, legal services as suspect categories-people seem to be buying 
health, life, and justice-whereas conservatives are not bothered by such transactions."); Mark A. 
Hall & Carl E. Schneider, The Professional Ethics of Billing and Collections, 300 JAMA 1806 
(2008); Pamela Hartzband & Jerome Groopman, Money and the Changing Culture of Medicine, 
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (2009); Marc A. Rodwin, Medical Commerce, Physician 
Entrepreneurialism, and Conflicts of Interest, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 387 (2007); 
Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing Politics of a Cultural Icon, 22 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 533 (1997). 
38. See generally Hall & Schneider, supra note 37 (discussing model generally used by health 
care providers). 
39. Specifically, The Coker Group report advises: 
If, for some reason, the patient indicates an inability to make a payment, the staff 
member should call the billing manager ... The manager should take the patient to a 
private room to discuss payment. The element of authority imposed by the billing or 
practice manager indicates that nonpayment is unacceptable. At the discretion of the 
manager, the patient may be allowed to leave without paying, but, preferably, with an 
agreed-upon plan for payment. In some cases, a fee should be charged if the patient is to 
be billed .... The long-range goal is to develop the understanding that arrangements for 
payments must be made in advance of the patient encounter. As with most matters 
related to credit and collection policy, it is essential to be consistent across the patient 
base. Consistent patterns of collection inform both the staff and the patients that direct 
patient payment is important. It's your money-ask for it! 
THECOKERGROUP,supra note 17, at42-43. 
40. See, e.g., Judy Capko, Physicians Practice Pearls: You Earned It, Now Collect It, 
PHYSICIANS PRAC., June 2007, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/ 
fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/l 008.htm (recommending payments at time of service); Pamela 
Lewis Dolan, Collecting the Patient Portion: Being Proactive, Early and Often, AM. MED. NEWS, 
April 2, 2007, at 18 (citing health care consultant saying "'Everyone needs to sign on that we are 
going to collect co-pays at the time of service.' ... The patient needs to be reminded over and over 
that this is the new system."); Kim LaFontana & Kim Williams, Practice Management Lab: 
Finding Success with Self-Pay, PHYSICIANS PRAC., July/Aug. 2006, available at 
http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/ articlelD/858.htm (referring to 
time of service as the "golden moment" for collecting payments from patients); Deborah Shapiro, 
How To Address Patient Payments: Can't Pay . .. Won't Pay . .. Should Pay, HEALTH CARE 
COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2008, at 3 ("The best time to collect money 
from patients is before the service is rendered, or at least right after the service and before they 
walk out the door."). 
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financially screen patients;41 when to terminate or embargo patients for 
nonpayment;42 how to physically arrange a medical office or hospital to 
encourage payment;43 what color envelopes should be used for medical bill 
collection letters;44 and even the optimal physical posture a staff member should 
41. For evidence of interest in financial screening of patients, see, for example, Emily Berry, 
Taking a Financial History: Determining the Health of Your Patient's Credit Rating, AM. MED. 
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, at 15; Financial Triage: Innovative Ways That Hospitals Are Looking at 
Patient Finances, Bus. WK., Nov. 20, 2008; Dave Hansen, Giving Credit To Get What's Due: How 
Doctors Can Help Patients Pay the Bill, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 21, 2008, at 15; Overdose of Debt: 
Lenders Push Risky Credit for Everything from Cancer Care to Botox, CONSUMER REPS., July 
2008, at 14, 17 (reporting on hospitals' use of credit scores or credit reports, and Equifax's 
Payment Predictor system); Maximizing Self-Pay Collections: Moving the Process Ahead, HEALTH 
CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2009, at 10 (discussing how hospitals 
may wish to use credit scoring or reporting "to get a glimpse of the patient's financial situation"); 
Judy I. Veazie, Point-of-Service Collections: When It's Too Late To Collect, HEALTH CARE 
COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2009, at 4, 5 (reporting the use of credit 
reports by providers to determine an approach for the self-pay portion of bills). 
42. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SOLOMON, THE PHYSICIAN MANAGER'S HANDBOOK: ESSENTIAL 
BUSINESS SKILLS FOR SUCCEEDING IN HEALTH CARE 107-08 (2d ed. 2008) (proposing a sample 
collection plan, providing suspension of future appointments for a patient who misses two 
successive co-payments until payment is satisfied); THE COKER GROUP, supra note 17, at 41, 57 
(recommending the dismissal of a chronic non-paying patient from a medical practice, particularly 
if it seems that the patient is not really in financial hardship); Dolan, supra note 40, at 18 
(paraphrasing Jeff Peters, CEO of Health Directions, a Chicago-based consulting firm, "[t]here's no 
crime in telling patients their balance must be paid or arrangements for payment be made before 
they get another appointment"); Shirley Grace, Physician Beware: 'The Dog Ate My Checkbook, ' 
PHYSICIANS PRAC., Feb. 2009, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/ 
fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/1285.htm; Wayne J. Gugliemo, When Patients Can't Pay: 
You 'II Collect More of What You 're Owed-and Enhance Loyalty-If You Have a Payment Plan, 
MED. ECON., June 3, 2005, at 49. One author compared conditioning treatment on payment for prior 
service to conditioning a future movie rental on payment for a prior rental. Curt Mayse, Front Desk 
as Profit Center, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Apr. 2005, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/ 
index/fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/641.htm. 
43. See, e.g., Suz Redfearn, Pay Up, Self-Payer: Getting the Most from Patients Who Pay Out-
of-Pocket, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Mar./Apr. 2002, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/ 
index/fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/293.htm (recommending that offices be set up to require 
patients to pass the collections desk on the way to the exit). 
44. See, e.g., Ten Tips for Improving Collection Letters, HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen 
Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2009, at 12 (recommending medical providers "[t]est pastel-
colored envelopes that will stand out against other mail" and "the use of PS to emphasize .. 
strongest points" relating to collection). 
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assume when attempting to collect from patients.45 Sources recommend making a 
"game" out of billing for employees to maximize receipts46 or motivating billing 
and collections employees with coffee cups, T-shirts, gift certificates, additional 
vacation days, or merit certificates.47 
If doctors adhere to the advice with some success, they may be able to avert 
the need for formal and more public ex post debt collection efforts.48 The practice 
management literature thus implicitly and explicitly encourages medical 
providers to shift the risk of patient default to third-party creditors: the common 
advice is, whenever possible, to "push the problem of nonpayment on to someone 
else.',49 
45. Collecting Assertively Is an Acquired Skill: Confidence and Empathy Are Key, HEALTH 
CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2007, at 7, 8 (recommending "good 
posture-no slouching" while collecting medical bills in person or on the phone). 
46. Dolan, supra note 40. 
47. THE COKER GROUP, supra note 17, at 38. 
48. See, e.g., Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 
FED. RES. BULL. 47, 67, 69 (2003) (using earlier data, estimating that medical bills accounted for 
18.2% of court judgments on credit reports and 52.2% of collection agency actions). 
49. Karen Caffarini, Keeping Rubber Checks from Clogging Revenue Flow, AM. MED. NEWS, 
Jan. 26, 2009, at 13; see also SOLOMON, supra note 42 (to make patient prioritize medical bills, 
"[r]emind the patient that he or she can use a credit card"); THE COKER GROUP, supra note 17, at 
41; Jeffrey C. Levitt, Transfer of Financial Risk and Alternative Financing Solutions, 30 J. HEALTH 
CARE FIN. 21, 26 (2004) ("Likewise, medical providers would rather have another party take the 
financial exposure from patients rather than keep it on their own balance sheets. They are in the 
business of providing health care, not consumer financing."); Patridge & Barry, supra note 18, at 
169-170 ("Whether in the form of credit cards, bank loans, or the more widely used electronic 
paper-free funding programs, it is critical that the hospital offer reasonable options to the patient 
without placing additional financial burdens on the hospital, such as carrying long-term payment 
plans."); Dolan, supra note 40 (reporting on consultant advising that medical practices should 
accept "all credit cards"); Mari Edlin, A Fair Trade?: Make Payment Policies Fair and Legal, 
PHYSICIANS PRAc., Nov. 2001, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/ 
fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/270.htm (citing practice manager saying: "We're not a bank. 
Take out a loan or charge it."); Gugliemo, supra note 42 (noting that experts suggest encouraging 
patients to put bill on credit card, rather than payment plan with provider, if patient is employed 
and not in particularly bad financial shape to "shift[ ] the credit burden . . . to the credit card 
company"); Pamela Moore, Billing and Collections: Playing Hardball: Advice on Charging 
Interest and Late Fees on Past-Due Patient Accounts, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Apr. 2008, available at 
http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/articlelD/1142.htm 
( encouraging providers to get patients to use credit cards for balances, or to encourage patients to 
borrow money from companies like CareCredit so "patient can work out his troubles with someone 
else"); Redfearn, supra note 43 (citing consultant recommending that providers "forge relationships 
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Credit cards facilitate the expectation in the health care marketplace that the 
patient will resolve the self-pay portion of a medical bill in a "retail business" 
fashion at the time of service.so Health care is analogized to hotels and car rental 
businesses when authors recommend that medical providers take credit card 
imprints before seeing or treating the patient.s1 Health industry consultants have 
extended such analogies by recommending "sales finance programs similar to 
those offered by appliance and auto dealers" for particularly large out-of-pocket 
medical expenditures.s2 
Providers and hospitals commonly take credit cards notwithstanding the 
servicing fees they must pay,s3 and a Federal Reserve Payment Card Center 
researcher has noted that doctors' offices more routinely include credit and debit 
card kiosks.s4 Not surprisingly, providers that have minimized ongoing patient 
receivables report a higher rate of identifying credit cards as an acceptable 
with local banks that can quickly arrange to grant small loans to patients"). 
50. See Elizabeth S. Roop, Debt load: Building a Better Payment Plan (for Hospitals and 
their Patients), 82 HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS 46, 47 (June 2008) (reporting on how a 
medical facility "vigorously pursues upfront payments ... [p ]atients are given the opportunity to 
make a payment over the phone, which speeds collection for the hospital. A 20 percent discount is 
provided for up-front payments ... "); Hansen, supra note 41; Kris Hundley, As Medical Costs 
Grow, Creditors Get in the Game, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at ID, available at 2008 
WLNR 3634947 (referring to retail business model); Patrick Reilly, Extracting Payment; Hospitals 
Try Collecting Before Patients Leave ER, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 17, 2003, at 8; Veazie, supra 
note 41, at 4, 5 ("Point-of-service tools, including the acceptance of credit cards, are very 
important."). 
5 I. Nick A. LeCuyer & Shubham Singha!, Overhauling the US Health Care Payment System, 
MCKINSEY Q., June 2007, at 6 (Web Exclusive), available at 
https://www.tipaaa.com/pdf/0verhauling%20the%20US%20Health%20Care%20Payment%20Syst 
em-McKinsey"lo20Report.pdf"toffering hotel and car rental analogy); Jayne Oliva, Consumer 
Directed Health Care: Zeroing in on Physician Practices, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, May/Jun. 2005, 
at 66, 67 ("Today's self-service generation will impel health care to mirror the banking industry" in 
terms of service delivery formats.). 
52. LeCuyer & Singha!, supra note 51, at 6. 
53. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Bethely, Collecting Patients' Share Up-Front Getting Easier, AM. 
MED. NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006, at I; Edlin, supra note 49 (noting that majority of physician offices 
accept credit cards); Levitt, supra note 49 (reporting that most hospitals accept credit cards for 
payment). But see Credit Cards and Medical Expenses: Combination Creates Dilemma for 
Patients, Providers, RECEIVABLES REP., Apr. 2007, at 3 (citing a Hospital Accounts Receivable 
Analysis survey in which only 47% of hospitals reported offering their patients the option of paying 
bills with credit cards). 
54. Kjos, supra note 16. 
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method of payment (92.2%).55 Although the total volume of credit card 
expenditures for medical bills remains murky, estimates are in the tens of billions 
and, at least before the implementation of the Credit Card Accountability, 
Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, were expected to 
multiply.56 
Issues surrounding medical billing and payment are complicated further in 
the context of emergency hospital care. The Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act, enacted in 1986, requires that hospitals provide services to 
anyone in need of emergency care, regardless of ability to pay.57 With emergency 
room revenue ( or any revenue) being important to a hospital's bottom line,58 
much management literature advises on how to effectively seek payment while 
complying with federal law. Experts emphasize prompt screening, and one notes, 
"[T]he best-performing hospitals ensure that a high percentage of [ emergency 
department] patients are financially screened prior to discharge."59 After a patient 
is stabilized, emergency department billing and collections practice thus 
resembles those practices already discussed. For instance, one consultant advises 
against an emergency department layout with multiple exits, which would enable 
patients to leave without discussing payment. 60 This same source cites the 
benefits of incentive programs for collections staff and lists credit card 
equipment as among the "nuts and bolts" of the emergency room collections 
process.61 
Credit products designed and offered specifically for patient management of 
out-of-pocket medical costs present another avenue for shifting risk away from 
providers.62 Medical providers typically do not bear legal liability for being 
55. Dolan, supra note 40. 
56. According to secondary reporting on a Visa USA study, credit cards were used for about a 
third (or $86 billion in 2005) of paid out-of-pocket health expenditures. Kjos, supra note 16. 
McKinsey consultants recently offered a $45 billion estimate in credit card self-pay health 
spending, but predicted a multiplication of this figure in the near future. LeCuyer & Singha!, supra 
note 51. Some of these estimates preceded the financial crisis. 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). Emergency intake personnel are also prohibited from delaying 
treatment to inquire about a patient's ability to pay or insurance status. See § 1395dd(h). 
58. For evidence that emergency room services are perceived as relatively unprofitable, see 
Jill R. Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit, and 
Government Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFF. 790, 792, exhibit l (2005). 
59. Michael S. Friedberg, Patient Access: A New Face for the Revenue Cycle, HEALTH CARE 
FIN. MAN., March l, 2007, at 90. 
60. Growing Focus on ED Collections: Here Are Tips, HOSP. ACCESS MGMT., Apr. 1, 2009. 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Creating Financing; Medicine on Installment Plan: Doctors 
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"arrangers" of credit.63 By contrast, providers who directly extend credit may be 
required to comply with and face potential liability under federal truth-in-lending 
laws and regulations, 64 as well as state credit laws or deceptive practices 
Offering Loans at 0%, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at Al (describing medical financing as "one of 
the fastest-growing parts of consumer credit, led by lending giants like Capital One and Citigroup 
and the Care Credit Unit of General Electric"); Grow & Berner, supra note 36 (referring to the 
"little-known medical debt revolution" and reporting that "[m]any patients say they don't realize 
their debts are being shifted to such interest-charging middlemen as GE Money Bank"); Hansen, 
supra note 41. Recent examples of medical-specific credit products, designed largely to supplement 
insurance, include the CarePayment card by Aequitas Capital Management, Care Credit by General 
Electric, Capital One, Citigroup, Hospital Expense Loan Program (HELP Financial), U.S. Bank's 
medical card, Complete Care, and MedKey Inc. See Schoen et al., supra note 26, at w307 (referring 
to medical debt as new growth industry); Card Industry Looks To Seal a Health Care Payments 
Gap, CARDS & PMTS (2007) (discussing CarePayment credit cards); Grow & Berner, supra note 36 
(reporting on interest rates charged by medical credit providers, but noting that interest is not 
always charged when parties buy the debt at discount and expect to collect full amount); Hundley, 
supra note 50 (reporting on hospital relationships with medical credit providers and interest rates as 
compared to some in-house payment plans); Overdose of Debt: Lenders Push Risky Credit for 
Everything from Cancer to Botox, CONSUMER REPS., July 2008, at 14 (listing medical credit 
"pitches" to patients and doctors); MedKey Healthcare Finance, http://www.medkeyinc.com (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2010) (offering line of credit for medical bills, 90 days interest-free, 5.99% 
thereafter). 
63. Federal consumer credit laws no longer include arrangers of credit under the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA). King v. Second City Constr. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15696, at *9 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 30, 1997) ("At one time, the definition of creditor under the TILA and its implementing 
regulations included 'arrangers of credit.' However, that portion of the definition was deleted from 
both the statute and the regulations in 1982."). We could find no evidence that state loan arranger 
or broker statutes have been applied to medical providers. For an example of a state broker statute, 
see, for example, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-5-3(e) (Lexis Nexis 2009) (defining a loan broker as "any 
person who, in return for any consideration from any source procures, attempts to procure, or 
assists in procuring, a loan from a third party or any other person, whether or not the person seeking 
the loan actually obtains the loan"). 
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(l 7) (2008) (portion of regulation Z defining creditor as "a person (A) 
who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written 
agreement in more than 4 installments (not including a down payment), and (8) to whom the 
obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement when there 
is no note or contract"). See also Bright v. Ball Memorial Hosp., 616 F.2d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(finding that a hospital can be "creditor" for purposes of TILA); James H. Backman, Consumer 
Credit and the Learned Professions of Law and Medicine, 176 B.Y.U. L. REV. 783 (1976); William 
D. Warren & Thomas R. Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REV. 793, 
819-20 (1972) (discussing refusal to exempt medical providers and other "professionals" from 
TILA, but noting some accommodations for installment payment practices); Edlin, supra note 49 
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statutes.65 This divergence in legal consequences not only contributes to 
providers' reluctance to charge interest when they do extend credit,66 but also 
increases the attractiveness of matching patients with specialty credit products. 
Medical credit products are becoming integrated with health care finance 
more generally: some providers of insurance products or self-insuring companies 
(recommending disclosures to comply with TILA if providers use payment plans); Gugliemo, 
supra note 42; Hansen, supra note 41; Moore, supra note 49 (recommending late fees rather than 
interest to ease TILA compliance); Practice Pointers: When Patients Can't Pay, MED. ECON., June 
3, 2005 (discussing legal implications of falling within consumer credit definitions); Todd Stein, 
Patients, Pay Up! You'd Better Have a Financial Policy, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Mar. 2005, available 
at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/article1D/629.htm (warning 
providers that if they charge interest, they should have an attorney review their policy for 
compliance with lending laws: "Because the rules are complex, most practices choose not to charge 
interest on balances owed."). 
65. See, e.g., Anderson v. Southeast Ala. Med. Ctr., 381 So. 2d 68, 70 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) 
(finding that defendant hospital was a "creditor" under ALA. CODE § 5-19-1(3) (1975), but not 
imposing finance charges for outstanding debt). See also Richard M. Alderman, The Business of 
Medicine-Health Care Providers, Physicians, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 Haus. L. 
REV. 109, 140 (1989). 
66. The AMA Code of Medical Ethics, which is non-binding on physicians, suggests that 
providers notify patients of the possibility of charging interest in advance of treatment. See AMA 
Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 6.08 (Interest Charges and Finance Charges) (1994), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/ 
opinion608.shtml. But charging interest does not seem to be the norm among medical providers. 
See Edlin, supra note 49 (reviewing negative aspects of doctors imposing finance charges); Moore, 
supra note 49 (citing consultant characterizing charging interest as "touchy area" and discouraging 
it); Stein, supra note 64 ("[M]ost practices choose not to charge interest on balances owed."); 
Hansen, supra note 41 (citing a consultant reporting that "many" medical practices do not charge 
interest, but that "it is prevalent for expensive medical procedures" and another consultant saying 
that "it's common for physicians to collect bills without charging interest," and a practice group 
reporting that it charges 6% annual interest if the bill is unpaid for more than six months); Cheryl 
L. Toth, Payment Plans/or Patients: Better Collections for You, PHYSICIANS PRAc., Jan./Feb. 2003, 
available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/articlelD/365.htm 
(discussing downsides of charging interest). For a recent controversial example, see Press Release, 
The Office of Attorney General Lori Swanson, Attorney General Lori Swanson Files Suit Against 
Allina Health System for Charging Usurious 18% Interest on Medical Debts (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.ag.state.mn. us/Consumer/PressRelease/090 l 22Allinalnterest.asp ( alleging provider 
charged 18% interest on outstanding balances up to $4,999 and 12% on balances from $5,000 to 
$9,999 in violation of Minnesota law); MINN. STAT.§ 334.01(1) (2008) (stating the legal standard 
interest rate of 6% annually and maximum rate of 8%). 
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join with banks to offer lines of credit for the self-pay portion of bills.67 Health 
savings accounts (HSAs), part of high-deductible health plans, may be directly 
linked with credit or debit cards.68 The justification for offering adjunct credit 
products is to allow consumers to bridge the gap between large deductibles and 
more meager HSA contents.69 Several companies have filed applications for 
business method patents for HSA payment systems with credit line components, 
suggesting significant investment in the combination of financing approaches. 70 
67. See, e.g., Freudenheim, supra note 62, at A2l ("Big insurers, too, are devising new 
financing plans with various payback options."); John Carroll, Banks Give Insurers an Offer Most 
of Them Cannot Refuse, MANAGED CARE, July 2006, http://www.managedcaremag.com/ 
archives/0607/0607.banks.html ("Companies with self-funded or self-insured health plans started 
offering employees a line of credit" from a bank that is a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group, "the 
OnePay Plan."); One Bill, OnePay: Pilot Program Simplifies Billing for Consumers and 
Physicians, HUB MAG., 2006, http://www.hubmagazine.net/pdfs/Ol4909 _ OnePay.pdf (discussing a 
pilot program in which the interest rate was set at the prime rate, and consumers made payment 
through payroll deductions). See generally E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans: 
Litigation Hazards for Health Insurers, 18 HEALTH MATRIX l, 30 (2008) (describing OnePay plan 
and potential problems); LeCuyer & Singha), supra note 51 (recommending that insurance 
providers offer credit lines to policy holders); Sarah Rubenstein, In New Health Plan, Patients Pay 
Their Share-Or Else, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at Bl. 
68. See, e.g., Jennifer Roy, HSA Lines of Credit, HSA HEALTHLINE (Choice Fin., Fargo, N.D.), 
Nov. 2007, available at http://www.choicefinancialgroup.com/hsa/healthline_newsletters 
/nov07.pdf(providing terms for Choice Financial's line of credit); Chase Health Savings Account, 
Healthcare Line of Credit, http://www.choicefinancialgroup.com/files/HSA_ Guide.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2010) (setting rate at 13.99% for interest rate on credit line); Provident Bank, Health 
Savings Account (HSA) Line of Credit, https://www.mtb.com/personal/healthsavingsaccount/ 
Pages/HSA.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (describing loans up to $10,000 and encouraging use of 
line of credit as overdraft protection); Visa Health Savings Account Card, 
http://usa.visa.com/personal/cards/prepaid/healthcare-card.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) 
(combining line of credit with health insurance identification card, capability of accessing other 
accounts, and reimbursement arrangements); US Bank, Health Savings Solution Product Guide, 
https://healthsavings.usbank.com/usbankhsa/forrns/Health%20Savings%20Solution%20product%2 
Oguide.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (including line of credit); see also CARDS & PMTS, supra note 
62; Tony Miller, Getting on the Soapbox: Views of an Innovator in Consumer-Directed Care, 25 
HEALTH AFF. w549, w550 (2006); Companies Offer Nation's First Credit Line to Owners of Health 
Savings Accounts, Bus. WIRE, June 27, 2005; Haugh, supra note 18, at 18. 
69. See, e.g., UMB Healthcare Services' Dennis Triplett Offers Perspective on HSA Line of 
Credit Solution, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-
finance/banking-lending-credit-services-cash/5345119-1.html. 
70. See, e.g., Method for Maintaining & Providing Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), U.S. 
Patent Application No. 20060200397 (filed Sept. 7, 2006). 
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In summary, the current health care system features constant, regular 
financial transacting between providers and their patients regardless of patients' 
insurance status. The sizeable number of patients with difficulty handling self-
pay obligations imposes additional financial risks on providers. The 
recommended approaches to managing these risks in light of legal and practical 
considerations encourage early payoff of health care providers and seek to avoid 
later direct legal enforcement to the extent possible. 
The practices that providers adopt to shape their financial transacting affect 
the ways in which researchers can measure patients' medical burden. We tum to 
this matter in the following subsection, focusing specifically on the measurement 
of burden for people who have filed for bankruptcy. 
2. Measuring Medical Burdens of Bankruptcy Filers 
Researchers have differed in their methods of identifying medical bills and 
medical problems among people who file for bankruptcy.71 Most bankruptcy 
studies use self-reported information in one form or another. 72 Elizabeth Warren, 
Jay Westbrook, and Teresa Sullivan honed the approach of using written 
questionnaires and other survey methods in the personal bankruptcy context. 73 
With respect to medical problems, Warren, Himmelstein, Woolhandler, and 
Thorne wrote a paper that used data from the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
("2001 CBP") studying filers in five states. A key data source was written 
questionnaires, on which respondents could indicate whether they had out-of-
pocket medical expenses of at least $1,000 in the two years prior to bankruptcy, 
medical uses of second mortgages, and health insurance coverage. Respondents 
also could pick reasons for bankruptcy (including illness or injury) from a list of 
71. For literature reviews, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, 
Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377 (2001) (summarizing earlier literature and referring to the bankruptcy 
system as an "overlooked source of information for purposes of the health care finance policy 
debates"); Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 301 (2007) 
( distinguishing studies of debt from studies of medical-related financial problems). 
72. Most general population studies that include bankruptcy-related questions use self-
reported information. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28; USA Today/Kaiser Family 
Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, supra note 36; APARNA MATHUR, AM. ENTER. INST., 
MEDICAL BILLS AND BANKRUPTCY FILINGS (2006), http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 
20060719 _ MedicalBillsAndBankruptcy.pdf. 
73. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE 
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989) (describing filers from 1981). 
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pre-coded options.74 The 2001 CBP undertook follow-up telephone surveys with 
a subset of the filers that reviewed out-of-pocket costs and medical diagnoses in 
greater detail. 75 Himmelstein and his coauthors analyzed that dataset and 
concluded in their first paper that nearly half of bankruptcies met at least one 
criterion for characterization as a "major medical bankruptcy" and more than half 
met a slightly more expansive definition of "any medical bankruptcy."76 
Published in the peer-reviewed journal Health Affairs as a web exclusive, the 
Himmelstein paper was released just as Congress was restarting deliberations on 
a major bill to restrict bankruptcy relief. Senator Grassley, a sponsor of that bill, 
requested that a division of the DOJ (the Executive Office for United States 
Trustees) determine the validity of the Himmel stein findings. 77 Assistant 
Attorney General William Moschella submitted a short letter and summary 
reporting the frequency and amounts of medical debt detectable in court records 
in a sample of "no-asset" chapter 7 cases. 78 Those figures are reprinted in Table 1 
in Part III; as noted in the introduction, Attorney General Moschella's letter and 
summary conveyed that the medical debt impact was modest. The letter closed 
74. David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF. 
W5-67 (Web Exclusive Feb. 2, 2005). 
75. Id. at W5-69. Among the respondents who participated in telephone interviews and said 
they had medical reasons for bankruptcy, the average amount of out-of-pocket expense ( excluding 
premiums) in the year leading to bankruptcy was over $3,500. Out-of-pocket expense since illness 
onset averaged approximately $12,000. Id. 
76. Id. at W5-66. Other studies have used the same data for analysis, see, e.g., Jacoby & 
Warren, supra note 33 (reanalyzing 2001 CBP data to show different ways to measure medical-
related bankruptcy), or adopted similar survey instruments for use on different populations. See 
WATSON, supra note 26 (using some CBP questions to study Missouri debtors); Ezekial Johnson & 
James Wright, Are Mormons Bankrupting Utah? Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 607 (2007) (replicating methods, finding that 61 % in study of filers in Utah 
reported that medical problems contributed to their bankruptcy filings). 
77. 151 CONG. REC. S2053, S2078 (Mar. 4, 2005) (reprinting Letter from William E. 
Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. DOJ, to Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Sen. (Feb. 10, 2005)). The 
letter characterized the Himmelstein et al. definitions of medical bankruptcy as "very broad" and 
highlighted that the article's broader definition of medical bankruptcy included drug addiction and 
uncontrolled gambling, id., although those factors were nominal additions to the overall count. 
78. For a description of the distinction between an "asset case" and a "no-asset case," see 
Dalie Jimenez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 795 (2009). An asset case is one in which there is property to distribute to unsecured 
creditors after secured creditors are paid any allowed secured claims and the debtor retains exempt 
property. Id. at 798. Accordingly, in a "no-asset case," debtors have no unencumbered non-exempt 
assets for distribution to unsecured creditors. Id. at 797. 
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by stating, "[T]he conclusion that almost 50 percent of consumer bankruptcies 
are 'medical related' requires a broad definition and generally is not 
substantiated by the official documents filed by debtors. "79 
Assistant Attorney General Moschella' s observation is based on the 
following method: whether coders could find holders of claims that had 
demonstrably medical names on "Schedule F ," a list of claims that bankruptcy 
filers must submit to the court. 80 On Schedule F, debtors list the amount of non-
priority unsecured claims ( claims owed to general creditors who lack collateral 
for these debts) owed at the time of filing and the identity of the holders of such 
claims at that time. The DOJ's summary of findings correctly noted that using 
Schedule F would exclude bills owed on the date of bankruptcy to a creditor with 
a non-medical name, but neither the summary nor cover letter highlighted or 
explained the relevance of this limit for those who would be unfamiliar with the 
ramifications. 81 
The court record method was not without precedent. Early studies of the 
bankruptcy system under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code used court records to start 
examining filers and the system. 82 Over time, researchers interested in the 
circumstances of bankrupt families began to identify pros and cons to using court 
records. 83 As studies of bankruptcy filers have evolved and use of consumer 
credit for various household purposes has grown substantially, so have the 
79. See supra note 77 (emphasis added). 
80. See Official Bankruptcy Forms, Schedule F: Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority 
Claims (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/8K_Forms_l207/ 
B_006F_l207fpdf See also supra note 77. 
81. See supra note 77. After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
was enacted, the Director of the United States Trustee Program was circumspect about what could 
be gleaned from Schedule F about medical burden. He observed that the Program did not have 
"definitive data" on the amount of medical debt owed by bankruptcy filers and that, even with data-
enabled forms that the Program hoped to develop, medical debt would be difficult to measure 
through those forms. Hearing on Working Families in Financial Crisis: Medical Debt and 
Bankruptcy, 110th Cong. 4-5 (2007) (statement of Clifford J. White III, Director, Executive Office 
for United States Trustees), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/July2007/ 
white070717.pdf White's testimony cited 2003 data in which 46% of the filers in no-asset chapter 
7 cases included medical debt on Schedule F, about 78% of them reported debt less than $5,000, 
and fewer than l % of the cases represented more than one third of the total medical debt. See id. at 
4. 
82. Examples include SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 73 (regarding filers from 1981); Susan D. 
Kovac, Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675 (1991) (describing filers 
from 1985-1986). 
83. See, e.g., Jacoby et al., supra note 71 (reviewing these concerns). 
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number of objections to measuring medical burden with court records.84 
Nonetheless, certain U.S. senators characterized the DOJ response as a 
debunking of the Himrnelstein study's finding that medical problems contributed 
to about half of bankruptcies. Senator Grassley issued a press release strongly 
suggesting that assertions of high percentages of medical-related bankruptcies 
were "myth."85 Senator Sessions also used the DOJ study to suggest that these 
percentages were a "fiction. "86 
84. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S6010 (May 26, 2005) (reprinting Letter from David 
Himmelstein, Assoc. Professor of Med., Harvard Med. Sch., et al. to Charles E. Grassley, U.S. 
Senator (Feb. 14, 2005)). This letter identified a list of debts that likely would be excluded from the 
analysis cited in the Moschella letter as well as the implications of including only no-asset chapter 
7 cases. 
85. Senator Grassley said: 
Make no mistake, misrepresentations about this legislation have been running rampant 
by those who oppose any meaningful bankruptcy reform. I've been in politics a long 
time, and I know that political criticism is never inhibited by ignorance. For instance, 
the statistical analysis in the U.S. Trustee's office examined over 5000 bankruptcy cases 
and found that under one-half listed medical debts of any sort. And those filers who did 
list medical debts, on average, listed under $5000 in medical debts. So much for the 
myth that most bankruptcies are driven [sic.] medical costs. The fact is there are abusers 
out there. The fact is S. 256 doesn't harm bankrupts with large medical debts. Let's stop 
the abuse. Let's return to common sense. Let's enact bankruptcy reform now, before the 
abuse gets worse. 
Press Release, Opening Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley at the Bankruptcy Reform Hearing 
(Feb. I 0, 2005), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/ Article.cfrn?customel_ dataPageID _ l 502==9716. 
86. Senator Sessions said: 
This is what the United States Trustee Program found in a much more extensive 
survey ... They were asked to survey the filings in their districts to find out what you list 
on your filing as your debts, who you owe. You actually list who it is. So, if it is a 
doctor bill, it is on there. If you don't put it on there you don't wipe out that debt and 
you remain obligated to pay it, so everybody puts every debt they have on the list so it 
can be wiped out when they file bankruptcy. What they found was, this professional 
study of 5,000 cases, not interviewing debtors but looking at what they put on their 
form, they found that only slightly more than 5 percent of the total unsecured debt 
reported in those cases was medically related. Only 5 percent was medically related. 
This is not 50 percent of the cases in bankruptcy being caused by medical-only 5 
percent of them, of the total debt, was medical ... For some people there is no doubt 
that medical debts are a cause for bankruptcy. I do not doubt that. But this idea that. . 
. we ought to assume that there is no fraud and abuse in bankruptcy and the idea that 
everybody is in bankruptcy because of medical debts is just not so. 
It is just not; it is a fiction. We need to get it out of our heads. 
15 l CONG. REc. S2077 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2005). Senator Comyn echoed the sentiments, saying: 
First, let me say to my friend, the Senator from Alabama, how much I appreciate his 
eloquence on this bill and his very successful attempt to explain to the American people, 
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Likewise, academic critics of the Himmelstein study highlighted the DOJ 
findings and lent credence to the court record method as a valid and useful 
measure of medical bill burden. 87 Within a lengthier critique of the Himmelstein 
study, two health care finance experts included a full paragraph identifying the 
DOJ findings as a counterpoint. 88 They used the DOJ findings to illustrate that 
medical debt is only a small proportion of bankruptcy filers' financial 
obligations.89 In written testimony for a congressional hearing, a law professor 
described and cited the DOJ findings for the proposition that only a few cases 
have sufficiently high medical debt for it to be properly characterized as a cause 
of bankruptcy. 90 
By 2009, interest in the scope of the medical bankruptcy problem 
intensified. Early in the year, then-President-Elect Obama's economic agenda 
included making it easier for people in medical-related bankruptcies to receive a 
discharge of debt.91 In the summer of 2009, Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, and 
Woolhandler released a new study estimating that 62% of bankruptcy filings 
could be counted as medical-related.92 That study's release dovetailed with 
debates on health care finance reform. In late July 2009, the House Judiciary 
Committee called a hearing to discuss whether the health care system was 
bankrupting American families. Representative Conyers cited the 2009 
Id. 
as well as to us, what is at stake here, and to knock down some myths that are being 
used to try to worry people when, in fact, there is no reason for people to be worried 
about this legislation. 
87. These writings also identified a range of other criticisms, unrelated to the data sources, 
which are beyond the scope of this Article. 
88. David Dranove & Michael Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH 
AFF. w78 (2006) (citing DOJ study and conclusion without qualifications). 
89./d. 
90. Working Families in Financial Crisis: Medical Debt and Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 
27-29, 32 (July 17, 2007) (statement of Todd J. Zywicki, Professor, George Mason Univ. Sch. Of 
Law). 
91. See Posting of Sarah Rubenstein to Wall St. J. Health Blog, Obama Aims To Help Patients 
Wipe Away Medical Debts, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/01/07 /obama-aims-to-help-patients-
wipe-away-medical-debts/ (Jan. 7, 2009, 2:06PM EST) (citing The Obama-Biden Plan, 
http://change.gov/agenda/economy_agenda (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) ("Obama and Biden will 
create an exemption in bankruptcy law for individuals who can prove they filed for bankruptcy 
because of medical expenses. This exemption will create a process that forgives the debt and lets 
the individuals get back on their feet.")). 
92. Himmelstein et al., supra note 7. 
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Himmelstein study as evidence that health care finance reform was urgently 
needed.93 But a witness at the hearing from the American Enterprise Institute 
returned to the DOJ findings, which she described as the "closest comparable 
survey," to cast doubt on Himmelstein's findings. 94 
No one has systematically examined the DOJ's court record method and 
why exactly it differs from the Himmelstein study's findings. We undertake that 
examination here by imposing both methods on, and collecting both types of 
information from, a single population. 
B. Data for the Current Study 
We analyze information from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project 
("2007 CBP"), a nationally representative study of approximately 2,500 personal 
bankruptcy cases.95 The response rate to the questionnaire portion was 50%.96 
Respondents and non-respondents shared similar characteristics on variables such 
as income, debt, assets, monthly expenses, and prior bankruptcies.97 The dataset 
has a slight underrepresentation of chapter 13 cases, which we correct with 
weighting when necessary.98 The median age of a filer in the 2007 CBP is 43, 
older than the median in the general U.S. population.99 Median household income 
93. Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 
4 (July 28, 2009) (opening statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Conyers090728.pdf. 
94. Id. at 6-7 (written testimony of Apama Mathur, Research Fellow, American Enterprise 
Institute), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mathur090728.pdf. 
95. Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer 
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 391 (2008) (describing the methods of the 2007 CBP). 
96. Id. at 392. 
97. Id. at 396. 
98. The average Schedule F medical debt is significantly higher for chapter 7 filers than 
chapter 13 filers, but there was no chapter-related difference in the likelihood of reporting medical 
debt on Schedule F. In addition, the median Schedule F medical debt for chapter 7 and chapter 13 
filers is not significantly different ($1,698 for chapter 7 filers versus $1,384 for chapter 13). Filers 
in the two chapters also had a similar distribution of Schedule F debts (as well as questionnaire 
expense) across the range, with the differences skewing the averages likely coming largely from the 
group of filers with Schedule F medical debts $10,000 and above. Thus, for most of our analysis, 
we combine the two kinds of cases without weighting, but indicate where we have used weighting. 
99. Deborah Thome, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability of 
Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 87, 92 (2009). 
The median age in the general population in 2007 was only 36. l. Id. at 93, fig. l. 
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of the sample is less than $28,000. 100 Median net worth is substantially negative 
(nearly -$24,400). 101 About half were homeowners when they filed for 
bankruptcy, and among them, median mortgage debt was just over $100,000. 102 
Respondents completed written questionnaires that included demographic 
information and other information about their pre-bankruptcy circumstances. 103 
For all respondents, the 2007 CBP also extracted information on approximately 
200 variables from court records, many of which are debtor-supplied under 
penalty of perjury. The 2007 CBP conducted follow-up telephone surveys with 
approximately 1,000 respondents within a year after they filed for bankruptcy. 104 
The approach taken in this Article is unique in several respects. First, we 
approximate the DOJ method of identifying medical debts from Schedule F in the 
court records. 105 This enables replication and closer scrutiny of the DOJ court 
record method. Second, we are able to isolate filers who specifically identified 
medical bills as a reason for bankruptcy as compared to lost income or the other 
ways medical problems can contribute to financial distress. 106 In addition, we use 
100. Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 359,404. The mean was under $31,000. Id. at 404. In 
terms of income distribution, about 85% of the 2007 CBP respondents had incomes below the U.S. 
national median household income in 2007 (undifferentiated by household size), and more than 
three in ten had incomes below the "poverty rate" for a family of four. For national median income 
figures, see CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, 5, 7 (2008), available 
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf. For the poverty guidelines, see U.S. Dept. 
of Health & Human Servs., The 2006 HHS Poverty Guidelines, 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/P0VERTY/06poverty.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). The income 
distribution of bankruptcy filers in the 2007 CBP is shown in Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 360 
fig.2. 
101. Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 371,405. 
102. Id. at 365. 
103. Id. at 399-402 (reproducing questionnaire). 
104. Id. at 396. As was previously noted, the telephone survey subsample is not significantly 
different from the whole regarding variables such as "filing status, filing chapter, total assets, total 
debts, priority debts, monthly income, [ and] home value." Id. at 396 n.177. 
105. The specific codebook instruction was as follows: 
This number represents the sum of debts that appeared to be owed to medical providers. 
Debts were counted as medical debts if they were owed to hospitals, doctors, labs, 
nursing homes and other treatment facilities, pharmacies, medical collection agencies, 
and anything else that looked related to health, medical, wellness, or sickness. 
106. Jacoby & Warren, supra note 33, at 563 (2006) (discussing the importance of income 
effects of illness or injury). Notably, for this Article, we are not seeking a comprehensive count of 
cases that could be construed as medical bankruptcies. In this respect, our study is distinct from the 
aim of Himmelstein et al., supra note 7. Still, the explicit "medical bill reason" for bankruptcy 
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a more detailed series of questions about out-of-pocket medical expenses that 
reveal respondents' medical bill management techniques. Specifically, the 
questionnaire asked whether respondents were directly responsible for medical 
bills uncovered by insurance within the two years leading up to the bankruptcy 
filing. 107 Respondents who said "yes" were asked additional follow-up questions: 
How did you, or a spouse or partner, pay for the medical bills or prescriptions 
that were not covered by insurance? Did you: Check all that apply: Pay with a 
cash, check, or debit card; Pay with a regular credit card; Pay with a medical 
credit card (such as CitiHealth Card, CareCredit, or MediCredit); Pay with 
money from a home equity loan or line of credit; Agree to a payment plan with 
the medical provider; Something else (please specify). 
The latter questions help us scrutinize the absence of a medical bill from the 
court records and off er a window into the management practices explored in Part 
II.A. For this Article, we report findings for all of the responses, and primarily 
discuss the options that most directly relate to discrepancies between the court 
record method and the survey method: cash, credit card, and home equity 
loans. 108 Also, whereas prior surveys asked only whether respondents incurred 
more than $1,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, respondents in this study were 
asked to identify the amount that they paid out-of-pocket within specified ranges: 
less than $1,000; $1,000-$5,000; $5,001-$10,000; and more than $10,000. This 
greater specificity enables a better comparison to the court record method and 
facilitates a more in-depth analysis of medical burden. Overall, our innovation is 
to deploy both the survey method and the court record method on the same 
dataset, and to use new methods of analysis to undertake this comparison. 
helps identify filers who are likely to have some non-trivial obligation. If court records are a useful 
source of information about medical burden, then we at least should be able to find evidence of 
substantial medical bills in the records of these respondents. 
107. The exact language of question 18 was: "During the TWO years before the bankruptcy, 
were you, or a spouse or partner, FINANClALL Y responsible for ANY medical bills, 
INCLUDING prescription medication or co-payments, that were NOT covered by insurance" 
(emphasis in original). The question did not ask the respondent to indicate the specific source of the 
cost (doctor, hospital, prescription drugs, etc.). 
108. A more in-depth evaluation of payment plans and "something else" (other forms of 
payment for medical bill payment not discussed in this Article) will be reported in a separate paper. 
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Ill. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
We start by reporting Schedule F medical debt. The left column of Table I 
replicates the information the DOJ reported to Congress. The middle column 
represents our 2007 CBP data limited to no-asset chapter 7 cases (liquidation 
cases) to most closely match the DOJ sample. The right column represents the 
2007 CBP full core sample that also includes chapter 13 (repayment plan) cases. 
TABLE 1: DOJ AND 2007 CBP SAMPLE COMPARISONS 
DOJ Sample (No-Asset 7s 2007 CBP Sample (No- 2007 CBP Sample (7s and 
Closed Between 2000 and Asset 7s Only) 13s) 
2002, Excluding N.C. & 
Ala.) 
All Cases 
N=5,203 N= 1,719 N=2,438 
54% listed no medical 48.4% listed no medical 49.8% listed no medical 
debt. debt (50.6% if including debt (50% if including 
cases with missing data). cases with missing data). 
Medical debt accounted for Medical debt accounted for Medical debt accounted for 
5.5% of the total general 6.2% of the total general 5.6% of the total general 
unsecured debt. unsecured debt unsecured debt 
($5,851,877 of ($7,727,494 of 
$93,095,955). $136,353,023). 
90.1 % reported medical 86.2% reported medical 88% reported medical 
debts less than $5,000. debts less than $5,000 debts less than $5,000 
(88.6% if inflation- (92.3 % if inflation-
adjusted to $5,734). adjusted to $5,734). 
1 % of cases accounted for 1 % of cases accounted for 1 % of cases accounted for 
36.5% of all medical debt. 37.3% of all medical debt. 35.4% ofall medical debt. 
Less than 10% of all cases 10% of all cases 10% of all cases 
represented 80% of all represented 80.3% of all represented 79.8% of all 
medical debt. medical debt. medical debt. 
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Cases with Anv Schedule F Medical Debt 
N=2,391 N=853 N=l,271 
Among the cases with Among the cases with Among the cases with 
medical debt, the average medical debt, the average medical debt, the average 
medical debt was $4,978 medical debt was $7,483 medical debt was $6,313 
per case ($5,709 in 2007 per case. per case (weighted by case 
dollars). type). 
78.4% reported medical 73.4% reported medical 76.1 % reported medical 
debt below $5,000 debt below $5,000; 76.3% debt below $5,000; 78.8% 
(average of$1,212 for this with inflation adjustment with inflation adjustment 
group). (average of$1,405 for this (average of $1,394 for this 
group). group). 
21.6% of cases accounted 21.6% of cases accounted 21.6% of cases accounted 
for 80.9% of all medical for 82.4 % of all medical for 81.3% of all medical 
debt. 109 debt. 1io debt. I I I 
Medical debt accounted for Medical debt accounted for Medical debt accounted for 
13.0% of the total general 12.3% of the total general 12.2% of the total general 
unsecured debt. unsecured debt. unsecured debt. 
Table 1 shows that the application of the court record method to the 2007 
CBP dataset produces results that are very close to the DOJ results. With respect 
to the differences, Table 1 indicates that our court records include a slightly 
greater proportion of cases with Schedule F medical debt than the DOJ sample. 
Also, our sample's average medical debt, as indicated by the court records, is 
higher than the DOJ sample's, even after adjusting the numbers for inflation 
using the Consumer Price Index. These increases are consistent with rising 
medical costs (at a rate that is outpacing inflation) and self-pay obligations during 
the 2000s. Furthermore, because the DOJ reported neither median debt nor a 
distribution of the larger debts, it is possible that a small number of large debts 
explain the differences in averages. 112 In Figure 1, we report the distribution of 
the 8% of our sample with more than $10,000 in Schedule F medical debt, 
109. We do not know why the DOJ reported this measure, but we replicate it in this Table. 
110. Additionally: I% of cases account for 2.9% of the total medical debt, I 0% of cases 
account for 67.4% of the total medical debt, and 20% of cases account for 81.4% of the total 
medical debt. 
111. Again, we offer more figures: 1 % of cases account for 2.5% of the total medical debt, 
10% of cases account for 65.3% of the total medical debt, and 20% of cases account for 80% of the 
total medical debt. 
112. We did not cap or remove outliers (disclosed in Figure I and note 113) because we found 
no evidence that the data in the DOJ report capped or excluded outliers. Earlier analyses by U.S. 
Trustee researchers appear to include the biggest Schedule F medical debts. See Ed Flynn & 
Gordon Bermant, The Class of 2000, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001, at 20 (reporting that "medical 
debt-figures were highly skewed by a few debtors with enormous medical debts."). 
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subdivided by chapter of bankruptcy filing. 113 
FIGURE 1: COURT RECORD MEDICAL DEBT OVER $10,000 
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Now that we have verified the similarities between the DOJ and 2007 CBP 
court records, we assess how well the court record method reflects pre-
bankruptcy out-of-pocket expenses. To be included in a court record count of 
medical bills, a bill must have several qualities. It must be outstanding on the 
date of the bankruptcy filing. The filer must know about the bill to report it. 
Finally, the holder of the claim must be identifiable as medical to a third-party 
coder. Figure 2 displays medical expense of the 2007 CBP sample as indicated 
on the questionnaire (the survey method) and on Schedule F (the court record 
method. Importantly, the questionnaire asked only about expenses within two 
years prior to filing, whereas court records include claims incurred at any time 
before filing. This comparison thus suppresses even greater potential differences 
between the measures. 
113. Of the filers with Schedule F medical debts over $100,000, four were just over this 
amount. Two had over $500,000. Three of these six filers were under twenty-five years old. 
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FIGURE 2: QUESTIONNAIRE-DERIVED MEDICAL EXPENSES AND SCHEDULE F 
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As Figure 2 shows, respondents had consistently lower levels of Schedule F 
medical debt than out-of-pocket medical expenses incurred within two years 
prior to filing. 114 The darker columns in Figure 2, which represent the 
questionnaire responses, show that nearly eight of ten respondents reported some 
out-of-pocket expenses within two years before filing, whereas medical debt 
could be found in the court records of only about five of ten respondents. 
We examined the level of congruence between the court record and 
questionnaire measures in various ways. We established the Cronbach's alpha 
between the two variables, which is 0.609. 115 This level of congruence between 
the two measures is low enough to merit concern about the validity of using one 
114. As illustrated by Figure I, the distributions of the two measures are different. Written 
questionnaire expense forms a unimodal distribution, with a peak at $1,001 to $5,000. Schedule F 
medical debt manifests a different pattern, with about half the respondents having zero Schedule F 
medical debt, and greater than eight out often reporting $5,000 or less. 
115. Cronbach's alpha is a measurement of how well two or more variables "hang together," 
or whether they measure a single latent construct. It is a measure of the reliability or consistency 
between the items at hand and is computed through the equation: a = _ cN·c > _ , where N is the 
v+ N-1 -c 
number of items, c is the interitem covariance, and v is the average variance of the items. At the 
most basic level, Cronbach's alpha allows a researcher to evaluate how well one variable can 
replace another variable. 
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of these measures as a stand-in for the other. 116 
Next, we engaged in a filer-by-filer comparison of the two measures, which 
can be explained as follows. First, we compared the dollar value of the court 
record and survey measures for each filer. Doing this, we identified about a third 
of respondents in our sample (32%) who reported expenses on the questionnaire 
based on the survey method, but who had no medical debt in their court records. 
Documenting precise declines in dollar amounts when neither number is zero is 
more difficult because the questionnaire asked for an estimate of expense by 
category rather than an exact dollar amount. But we conservatively estimate that 
an additional 56% of the sample had less Schedule F medical debt than 
questionnaire-reported expenses. 117 
Our second filer-by-filer approach was to subtract a categorized measure of 
Schedule F medical debt from the questionnaire medical expenses category for 
each respondent. 118 For each case, this produced a nine-point scale ranging from 
116. Generally, for comparing groups, a Cronbach's alpha of0.70 to 0.80 or higher allows one 
to substitute one variable for another or to create a composite variable using the two measures. See 
J. Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman, Statistics Notes: Cronbach 's Alpha, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 572, 
572 (1997). 
117. To calculate the differences between questionnaire-reported medical expense and 
Schedule F medical debt for this particular finding, we subtracted each individual's reported 
expense from Schedule F medical debt, allowing us to compare the two reporting processes in a 
"pair-wise" manner. We needed to estimate a dollar amount for expense because the questionnaire 
asked only for categories of expenses. To estimate, we took the middle point of each expense 
category and used that to calculate the difference. For example, for the category $1,000 to $5,000, 
each respondent who reported expenses in that range was assigned a dollar debt amount of 
$3,000.50. For those who reported "more than $10,000" in expense, we assigned a dollar amount 
of$15,000 for purposes of this analysis. We believe that this is a particularly conservative estimate, 
given that on Schedule F, only half of the medical debts over $10,000 were also under $20,000. See 
supra p. 267, fig. I. To prevent these respondents from skewing the average difference between the 
two measures, we coded anyone who reported "more than $10,000" in expenses on the 
questionnaire and reported more than $10,000 in debt on Schedule F as having zero difference 
between the the two measures. Again, this allows our measure to be conservative. 
118. The initial categories of expense, consistent with the ranges on the questionnaire, are 
coded as follows: "zero" means no expense, "I" means under $1,000; "2" represents expense 
between $1,000 and $5,000; "3" means expense between $5,001 and $10,000; and "4" represents 
more than $10,000. Subtracting the category of Schedule F debt from the category of questionnaire 
expense indicated by each respondent yields a number between "-4" and "+4." These numbers thus 
take on a meaning different from the original codes. For example, "zero" indicates the same 
category of expense on both measures, whether that category is no medical bills or over $10,000 in 
medical bills. When we use numbers in the appendices and going forward, we are referring to the 
result of this subtraction. 
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"-4" to "+4". A "-4" signifies that an individual had more than $10,000 in 
Schedule F medical debt and no questionnaire-reported expenses. A "+4" 
signifies that an individual had more than $10,000 in expenses on the 
questionnaire but no Schedule F medical debt. Appendix A shows the 
distribution of cases along this scale. 
Most respondents fell within the same category of expenses under both 
measures or had more survey expenses than court record medical debt. 119 About 
one-fifth of the sample clearly had out-of-pocket expenses that were at least 
$1,000 more than their Schedule F medical debt, and often the difference was 
more than $5,000 or more than $10,000. 12° Cases fitting this description reveal 
most clearly the difficulties of relying on only court records; they also present the 
most interesting questions of how these households managed to reduce medical 
obligations in the midst of financial problems. 
Although the additional analysis using this scale focuses on this fifth of 
respondents, we must emphasize that this is not a comprehensive count of people 
with serious medical burden. Some respondents with very significant medical 
119. In the group of cases on the negative side of the scale, Schedule F medical debt exceeded 
the questionnaire reports of expense. We strongly suspect that these cases can be explained by the 
timing: the questionnaire asked for out-of-pocket expense only within the two years prior to filing. 
By contrast, Schedule F captures debts older than two years. Some particularly big debts are likely 
to be older. Notably, the presence of some cases with Schedule F debt older than two years and no 
recent out-of-pocket expense slightly dampens the discrepancy between these two measures of 
medical burden. A small number of such cases may not only raise the Schedule F medical debt 
averages, but also could make the highest dollar category of medical bills (see supra p. 268, fig.2) 
seem more consistent across measures than it really is. Although we believe this to be the dominant 
explanation, particularly for the cases in the "-4" and "-3" categories, we offer several others as 
well. While completing the exact dollar amounts on Schedule F, respondents may have been more 
likely to have been consulting direct documentation and to be completing the paperwork with a 
lawyer. A debtor who estimated even a few dollars less on the questionnaire could create a 
discrepancy when this measure was compared with Schedule F medical debt. Most discrepancies 
on the negative side of the scale are within a one or two point difference, and thus potentially are of 
smaller amounts. Also, some medical providers impose interest and/or finance charges. A 
respondent may have recalled and reported only principal on the questionnaire, while Schedule F 
lists the legally collectible debt that includes these additional amounts. Finally, although the coding 
error rate in this study was very low, error remains a possible explanation. For the rate, see Lawless 
et al., supra note 95, app. 
120. We refer here to categories "+2," "+3," and "+4," which represent having out-of-pocket 
expenses of at least $ I ,000 more, $5,00 I more, or $10,00 I more, respectively, than Schedule F 
medical debt. The 20% figure is premised on missing variables being included in the total count. 
See infra app. A. 
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bills do not have verifiable discrepancies between the court record and survey 
measures. The most populous group of filers, whose expenses fall within the 
same category on both measures (as indicated by a "zero"), is very diverse 
regarding the amounts of medical debt these respondents faced both before and 
during bankruptcy. For example, 11 % of all respondents who are a "zero" had 
over $10,000 of expenses in both the questionnaire and Schedule F. Such a 
respondent may have owed $50,000 in medical bills beforehand and could either 
continue to owe those bills to a provider or have reduced them to some amount 
above $10,000 identifiable as medical bills on Schedule F. An additional 4% had 
between $5,000 and $10,000 of medical expenses on both measures. 121 The 
average Schedule F medical debt for this "zero" group is just under $5,000, 
suggesting that individuals could, in fact, have paid thousands of dollars towards 
their medical debt while still occupying the same category of expenses on the 
two measures. Cases that are a single category greater as recorded by the survey 
method compared to the court record method (a"+ 1" in Appendix A) also mask a 
wide range of dollar differences and significant medical obligations for the same 
reasons. 122 
With respect to the fifth of the sample with the biggest verifiable 
discrepancies between the measures, a variety of possibilities could explain why 
the same debtor reported a large amount of medical expenses in the questionnaire 
but had little ( or no) identifiable Schedule F medical debt. There is the standard 
problem that some medical providers or their debt collectors do not have 
medical-sounding identities that court record coders can discern. 123 Also, having 
more questionnaire-reported medical expenses than Schedule F medical debt 
could reflect that individuals on the brink of bankruptcy paid off some or all of 
their medical bills. 124 Such payoff would not necessarily signify a lack of 
121. Forty percent of those who have the same category of medical expense on the 
questionnaire and medical debt on Schedule F had no out-of-pocket medical expenses or medical 
debt. 
122. Those respondents that fall in the "+1" category have, on average, just under $1,000 in 
Schedule F medical debt and are most likely to report less than $1,000 in out-of-pocket expenses in 
the two years prior to filing. However, like the "zeros," these individuals could easily have large 
differences in the amount of expense and Schedule F medical debt. For example, some respondents 
indicated more than $10,000 in expense and reported between $9,000 and $10,000 in medical debt 
on Schedule F. It is possible that they had $10,001 in expenses and only paid off $100 of that debt, 
putting them in one category lower, but it also is possible that respondents had $25,000 in expenses 
and paid $15,100 off those expenses off prior to bankruptcy. 
123. See infra note 152. 
124. See generally Christopher Tarver Robertson, Michael Hoke & Richard Egelhof, Get Sick, 
Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 90-92 
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financial burden from the bills; money is fungible and financially distressed 
families constantly make difficult choices about how to juggle expenses. Those 
filers most concerned with maintaining relationships with doctors could have 
fought very hard to pay these expenses while defaulting on other major 
obligations or satisfying those obligations using credit cards. 125 We can test the 
payoff hypothesis by looking at how the filers report managing their medical 
expenses, paying careful attention to the reported use of cash or cash equivalents. 
In addition, some existing medical bills might simply be missing from 
Schedule F. This could be due to inadvertence,126 a mistaken belief that insurance 
would fully cover a pre-bankruptcy procedure, 127 or a more intentional effort to 
hide the bankruptcy from a provider (who, if not listed, may not hear about the 
case) to avoid a feared disruption in health care. 128 The possibility that these 
circumstances explain the complete disappearance of a medical bill can be 
explored in part by looking at cases in which complete payoff would be most 
unlikely due to the size of the bills. 
As the literature review suggested, reporting more expenses on the 
questionnaire than medical debt on Schedule F also could be due to the use of a 
credit card, home equity loan, or less formal borrowing to finance part or all of 
medical bills. In such an instance, out-of-pocket medical expenses, even if not 
paid fully by the time of filing bankruptcy, would not appear as Schedule F 
medical debt. Or, Schedule F medical debt would be lower in amount while debt 
to other creditors would likely be higher. 
Discrepancies also could reflect that people overly attribute their financial 
problems on questionnaires to medical issues, which seem like a socially 
acceptable basis for overindebtedness. 129 Due to the methods employed here, this 
is less likely to explain the discrepancy in this study. The discrepancy reflected in 
(2008) (reporting statements of foreclosure defendants that they had reallocated money intended for 
their mortgages toward medical bills). 
125. It also is possible that providers gave respondents significant discounts for prompt 
payment that remain invisible to us, although those payments could have come from another credit 
source. 
126. See, e.g., In re Hocum, 119 B.R. 723 (Bania. D.S.D. 1990) (granting debtor's post-
discharge request to amend Schedule F to include accidentally omitted $262.94 hospital bill that 
had been assigned to debt collector). 
127. For example, in one case, the debtor originally failed to list a medical debt on Schedule F 
because he thought Medicare would fully cover his cataract operation. He amended Schedule F 
once he realized his error. See In re Nosier, 2007 WL 4322315 (Bania. M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2007). 
128. See Jacoby et al., supra note 71, at 383. 
129. See id. at 384-85 for discussions of overmedicalization generally. 
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Figure 2 and the text is based on a purely factual question about out-of-pocket 
obligation not covered by insurance. The 2007 CBP questionnaire did not ask 
people about "medical debt," which could be susceptible to inconsistent 
interpretations. Thus, the survey method variable for out-of-pocket expenses is 
straightforward. In addition, when respondents were asked to indicate their 
reasons for filing for bankruptcy-the place where overmedicalization would be 
most suspected-they did not merely check every available reason for filing that 
might be sympathetic. Indeed, only three out of ten respondents explicitly 
indicated medical bills as a reason for bankruptcy, even though far more reported 
substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses and had other indicators of distress. 130 
In other words, it is possible that respondents have assigned too little 
responsibility to their medical problems for their financial downfall. 131 Even the 
greatest skeptics of the studies by Himmelstein et al. would be unlikely to 
suggest that the three out of ten people who reported medical bills as a reason for 
bankruptcy lacked any medical liability. 
To begin our assessment of the possible explanations for discrepancies 
between the court record and survey methods, we look at the raw percentages on 
the use of cash, credit cards, and home equity loans for people with any medical 
expenses not covered by insurance. 132 These absolute percentages of credit usage 
presumably are dampened by the proximity to bankruptcy when some filers 
already have consumed their available credit. 133 But the overall frequency is less 
130. Respondents in our sample selected an average of 4.33 reasons for filing out of a total of 
19. Respondents who included the medical bill reason had a slightly higher average (5.75), but this 
can be explained by the fact that there was a strong association between reporting medical bills as a 
reason and the other medical reasons on the list of responses. For more information about the 
indication of medical reasons for filing, see infra p. 281, fig.6. 
13 I. Jacoby & Warren, supra note 33. 
132. The percentages in Figure 3 vary slightly from those in Appendix B because the 
questionnaire variables had fewer missing data points. Appendix B looks at these variables in 
combination with the court record variables, which reduced the number of observations. Also, 
Appendix B shows the difference in home equity loan use if one includes all who reported expense 
regardless of housing tenure. 
133. We do not know the credit limits of our respondents. Because credit limits are not 
regularly reported in the general population, studies have used various techniques to estimate them. 
See ROBERT B. AVERY ET AL., AN OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER DATA AND CREDIT REPORTING, FED. 
REs. BULL. 58 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/ 
0203lead.pdf. The most common approach is to use the highest balance ever reported as the credit 
limit. Using this technique, Avery et al. found in their 2003 paper that about 25% of revolving 
accounts in the general population had a credit limit below $1,000; 41 % had a credit limit between 
$1,000 and $4,999; and only a very small percentage had a credit limit of $25,000 or more. Id. 
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important than the circumstances under which respondents used credit. Figure 3 
shows medical bill payment methods broken down by those respondents who 
reported that medical bills were a reason that they filed for bankruptcy and those 
who did not. This breakdown demonstrates that respondents who indicated 
medical bills as a reason for filing use regular credit cards and home equity loans 
at a much higher level. In this Figure, the vertical axis shows the percentage of 
respondents with medical expenses. 134 The horizontal axis is a breakdown of the 
use of different methods of paying medical bills. 
FIGURE 3: METHODS OF MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS 
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Figure 3 illustrates that those who reported medical bills as a reason for 
bankruptcy said they used home equity for medical bills nearly four times as 
frequently as the other respondents, and had a higher rate, by more than a third, 
of using credit cards to pay medical bills. 135 The markedly higher use of home 
Looking at the overall profile ofrevolving accounts, the average credit limit was about $4,500. Id. 
134. Here, as before, we examine only those respondents who indicated having any out-of-
pocket medical expense in the two years prior to filing for bankruptcy. 
135. Differences between those with a medical bill reason for filing and those without a 
medical bill reason for filing are statistically significant (p-value :::: .05) for use of both credit cards 
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equity loans and credit cards to pay medical bills among those who reported 
medical bills as a reason for filing is of particular importance to our analysis. If 
an individual pays for medical care with a credit card or home equity loan, then 
these expenses will not be identified as medical bills in court records. The data 
presented in Figure 3 thus support a more nuanced and multi-instrument 
approach to evaluating the effect of medical debt on bankruptcy filings. 
We also examined the congruence between medical obligations captured by 
the court record and survey methods depending on whether respondents listed a 
medical bill reason for bankruptcy. Respondents who identified this reason for 
filing for bankruptcy had, on average, twice the difference between survey 
medical expenses and Schedule F medical debt as those who did not identify 
medical bills as a reason for filing. 136 And, as noted in the introduction, over one 
quarter (27%) of those who identified a medical bill reason for bankruptcy had 
zero Schedule F medical debt, rendering them invisible in the court record 
method. 
To explore further the possible explanations for reduced or invisible medical 
debt using the court record method, we look at the medical bill management of 
respondents based on the levels of discrepancy between the two methods of 
measurement. 137 Appendix B reports all of our results as well as whether the 
differences are statistically significant using a traditional ANOV A test. 138 Figure 
4 shows three important methods of responding to medical bills. It reports these 
in groups that had increasing amounts of difference between the court record and 
survey methods. If paying off medical bills in full were the explanation for the 
decline or disappearance of medical bills by the time of bankruptcy, we would 
expect to see high rates of reporting use of cash and cash equivalents by 
and home equity loans. All differences, when tested across the three groups-I) all respondents 
with medical expenses, 2) those with a medical bill reason for filing, and 3) those without a medical 
bill reason for filing-are statistically significant with an ANOV A test. However, we cannot 
identify which of the differences are causing that statistical significance. ANOV A is an "ANalysis 
Of V Ariance" test, which compares group means by analyzing comparisons of variance estimates 
to determine whether the differences in means are statistically significant. 
136. The difference is statistically significant. Overall, all respondents reported just over half 
of a category more of medical expense than of Schedule F medical debt. Those who listed medical 
bills as a reason for filing had, on average, approximately three-quarters of a category more of 
medical expense than Schedule F medical debt. Those who did not indicate medical bills as a 
reason for filing had less than 0.4 of a category more medical expense than Schedule F medical 
debt. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 118-122. 
138. As these variables are coded as "Yes" or "No" variables, the frequency can be essentially 
understood as the percent of respondents in the group replying affirmatively to the question. 
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respondents with the biggest gaps. Figure 4 and Appendix B show a pattern of 
slightly decreasing use of cash, with the lowest frequency of cash usage reported 
by those who reported over $10,000 of medical expenses on the questionnaire 
but had no Schedule F medical debt. 139 The pattern in Figure 4 suggests that 
having lower Schedule F medical debt is not due to individuals paying off 
medical bills completely with cash, debit cards, or checks before filing for 
bankruptcy. 
FIGURE 4: USE OF CASH, CREDIT CARDS, AND HOME EQUITY LOANS FOR MEDICAL 
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By contrast, Figure 4 illustrates a positive relationship between the reported 
use of a regular credit card to pay medical bills and the difference between the 
reported expenses on the questionnaire and Schedule F medical debt. 140 This is 
139. The difference in use of cash, debit cards, and checks is statistically significant to the 
0.002 level. Using the ANOV A method of testing the differences in the groups does not allow us to 
identify which differences are statistically significant, but does allow us to demonstrate that the 
overall patterns of use vary enough to be statistically significant. 
140. The differences in use of a regular credit card for medical bills are statistically significant 
276 
MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS 
consistent with the concern that debts transferred to credit cards become 
minimized or invisible in court record studies. 141 
Filers with significantly greater out-of-pocket expenses than Schedule F 
medical debt also indicated use of home equity loans with much greater 
frequency. 142 This is especially true for those with at least $10,001 more in 
expenses than Schedule F medical debt; over a quarter of this group used home 
equity loans to pay medical debts. This is in sharp contrast to the overall rate of 
5.8% who used a home equity loan to pay off medical debt among all 
homeowners in the 2007 CBP. 
Appendix C displays the comparative medical bill management for the group 
of respondents with more than $10,000 in expenses reported on the questionnaire 
and zero Schedule F medical debt. Members of this small group would have had 
to expend significant effort to pay off $10,000-or much more-completely in 
cash before bankruptcy. Also, this biggest of possible differences between the 
measures would be less likely to be due to forgetfulness about medical bills, 
partial payoff of medical bills, seeking to hide their bankruptcy cases from 
providers, or other such explanations. Respondents in this group reported using 
home equity loans for medical bills at over four times the frequency of everyone 
else; they also reported using credit cards twice as often as everyone else. 
to the <0.001 level. Like anyone reporting medical expense on the questionnaire, the group that 
reported over $10,000 of debt on Schedule F and zero expense on the questionnaire would have 
skipped the question about managing out-of-pocket expense and thus had the "lowest" use of all 
methods of payment. 
141. As another measure, when we isolated and compared the Schedule F medical debt of 
those who indicated using credit cards for medical bills from those who did not so indicate, the 
credit card users reported lower average and median medical debts. However, credit card users had 
nearly twice the amount of credit card debt. Credit card users had $5,264 average Schedule F 
medical debt versus $6,841 for non-credit card users. We also compared medians: those who used 
credit cards to pay medical bills had a median Schedule F medical debt of $1,473, compared to 
$1,791 for those who did not use a credit card. The difference is significant to the 0.05 level. Those 
who reported using a regular credit card to pay for medical expenses filed, on average, $31,853 in 
credit card debt on Schedule F, compared to $15,792 in credit card debt for those who did not use a 
regular credit card to pay medical expenses. 
142. Figure 4 portrays the percentages of those who owned a home and used a home equity 
loan for medical expenses; if we look at all filers, (i.e. not just those who owned a home in the last 
five years) we see a similar pattern, but smaller numbers. For example, 19% of those in the highest 
group report using a home equity loan, compared to 3% of those reporting the same amount on both 
measures. The differences exhibited using either methods of measurement are statistically 
significant to the 0.0001 level. All data on the individual breakdown of use of home equity loans 
are available in Appendix B. 
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Generally, filers with the greatest amounts of out-of-pocket expenses but zero 
Schedule F medical debt had a much higher rate of reporting that they shifted 
obligations to alternate creditors that are undetectable as medical on court 
records. 
To further corroborate these findings, we looked at the amount reported on 
Schedule F of claims owed to credit card lenders (as opposed to claim holders 
with medical identities ). 143 Figure 5 reports the results. 
FIGURE 5: AVERAGE SCHEDULE F CREDIT CARD DEBT, BY GAP IN 
MEASURES 
$40,000 
$35,000 
$34,523 
... $28,891 ,Q $30,000 Q,l $27,334 ~ 
"Cl 
I. $25,000 ~ 
u 
... 
:a $20,000 Q,l 
I. 
u $15,000 Q,l 
... 
·= i:: $10,000 Q,l 
~ 
$5,000 
$-
$1,000 or more of $5,001 or more of $10,001 or more of 
OOP than Schedule F OOP than Schedule F OOP than Schedule F 
As Figure 5 shows (and is reported more fully in Appendix D) the amount of 
Schedule F credit card debt grows as the gap increases between the survey and 
court record methods of identifying medical obligation. 144 The filers represented 
143. It can be difficult to identify credit card debt because of the variety of ways debt can be 
listed on Schedule F. Although we would get the same results either way as the next footnote 
explains, we used a very conservative, lower bound definition of credit card debt by using only debt 
in which the listing contained the words "credit card," "card," "revolving credit," "charge account," 
or closely similar terms. Also, any listing that contained brand name words for a credit card, such 
as "Visa," "MasterCard," or "Discover," was counted as definitely credit card debt. 
144. This result is obtained with the "definitely credit card" variable, but the same pattern 
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in Figure 5-the fifth of the sample with verifiably higher out-of-pocket 
expenses than Schedule F medical debt-had much greater average credit card 
debts than the $19,006 average credit card debt of all filers in the sample, and 
also had higher median credit card debts than the median of the overall sample. 
Again, this suggests that those with less Schedule F medical debt are not 
necessarily paying off medical debt with ease, but rather are shifting medical 
bills to alternate forms of credit. 145 These findings also support the story that 
bankruptcy filers in our sample made their medical providers a higher priority 
than other types of creditors. As money is fungible, these individuals went into 
bankruptcy with lower medical debt but higher levels of credit card debt. 146 In 
addition to the court record information on credit card usage, we find a parallel 
trend regarding home mortgages. As the gap grows between the questionnaire 
medical expenses and Schedule F medical debt, so do the amounts of secured 
claims against filers' residences. 147 This generally corroborates filers' reporting 
of home equity use for medical bills. 
We explored other indicators that might shed light on why medical expenses 
are not appearing on Schedule F. The 2007 CBP questionnaire asked respondents 
to indicate whether they engaged in a variety of methods to "make ends meet" 
during the previous two years. 148 We were interested in whether respondents with 
emerged when we conducted the same analysis with the "probably credit card" variable, as well as 
with the two measures combined. 
145. The pattern is the same for both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases, but the amounts in 
chapter 7 cases are higher for cases fitting the two left-most columns on Figure 5. 
146. These results are consistent with an earlier analysis of no-asset chapter 7 cases by 
researchers at the Executive Office for United States Trustees (in DOJ), in which Schedule F credit 
card debt levels were particularly high among filers with no observable medical debt on Schedule 
F. See Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Credit Card Debt in Chapter 7 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 20 (credit card debt of those with no Schedule F medical debt was higher 
than those with Schedule F medical debt and "was more than twice as high as for debtors who 
listed at least $5,000 in medical debt"); see also MICHELLE M. DOTY ET AL., SEEING RED: THE 
GROWING BURDEN OF MEDICAL BILLS AND DEBT FACED BY U.S. FAMILIES (Commonwealth Fund 
Issue Brief, 2008), available at http://www.comrnonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/lssue-
Briefs/2008/ Aug/Seeing-Red--The-Growing-Burden-of-Medical-Bills-and-Debt-F aced-by-U-S--
F amilies.aspx. 
147. Home owners with the highest level of difference between medical expenses and 
Schedule F medical debt (i.e. at least $10,001 more in medical expenses than Schedule F medical 
debt) also have the highest level of secured claims against their residences, a dollar figure which 
declines as the difference between medical expenses and Schedule F medical debt decreases .. 
148. The questionnaire asked: "During the TWO years before the bankruptcy, did EITHER 
you or a spouse or partner DO, or TRY TO DO, any of the following things in order to make ends 
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increasingly greater questionnaire-reported expenses than Schedule F medical 
debt were more likely to report "Consolidated debts with a credit card or new 
loan" or "Put necessities on the credit card (for example, food or monthly bills)" 
as coping options. As Appendix E shows, those with higher expenses than 
Schedule F medical debt were more likely to say that they put necessities on the 
credit card. 149 
Finally, we tum back to filers' stated reasons for bankruptcy, which in 
Figure 6 are broken down based on the size of the difference between the court 
record and survey measures of expenses. This helps determine the consequences 
of relying exclusively on the court record method to measure medical-related 
financial burden. As Figure 6 shows and Appendix F reports more fully, as the 
gap between the court record and survey measures grows, so does the percentage 
of respondents who indicated medical bills as a reason for filing for bankruptcy 
(the left-most column in each grouping). These findings suggest that the court 
record method particularly under-represents medical bill problems for filers who 
reported medical reasons for filing for bankruptcy. 
meet? (Check all that apply.)" Possible responses were: "Worked more hours or got another job; 
Cashed out or borrowed from a retirement, a 401k, a pension account or life insurance; Refinanced 
your home, took out a home equity loan or line of credit, or took out a debt consolidation loan that 
was secured by your home; Sold your house; Asked creditors, such as landlords or credit card 
companies, to work with you on the payments; Sold or pawned a car, furniture, or other personal 
property; Consolidated debts with a credit card or new Joan; Used a payday loan business (for 
example, Check to Cash) or car title lender to borrow money or take a cash advance; Put necessities 
on the credit card (for example, food or monthly bills); Accepted or borrowed money from family 
or friends; Accepted or borrowed money from a religious group or charity; or Something else." 
149. They were not more likely to say that they consolidated debt on a credit card or new loan, 
but it is not obvious that respondents would conceptualize moving medical bills to credit cards as a 
consolidation. 
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FIGURE 6: MEDICAL-RELATED REASONS FOR FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY, BY 
GAP IN MEASURES 
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Figure 6 presents the distribution of individuals who said that medical bills, 
medical problems of self or spouse, or medical problems of other family 
members were a reason for filing. Again, this distribution is categorized by the 
difference between the medical expenses reported on the questionnaire and the 
amount of medical debt reported on Schedule F. Note that two-thirds of 
respondents with more than $10,000 in medical expenses on the questionnaire 
and zero medical debt on Schedule F reported that medical bills were a reason for 
filing for bankruptcy. Thus, Figure 6, like Figure 3, shows that those most 
affected by medical debt are less likely to show up in a court records study. 150 
Had we conducted our study relying entirely on court records as the DOJ did in 
2005, our medical debt count would not have included a single member of this 
150. While the number of cases that fall into the category of $10,000 or more expenses 
reported on the survey and zero Schedule F medical debt is small (19 cases in our sample), this 
group represents a very conservative method of analyzing medical debt in bankruptcy. 
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group. 151 For the other respondents represented on Figure 6, a study relying 
exclusively on the court record method would have significantly understated their 
medical burden. 
The analysis for this project has limits. First, as noted earlier, any attempt to 
code medical debts from court records risks the omission of providers or related 
parties with no obvious health care designation in its name; our study is no 
exception. 152 This limit is consistent with our conclusion that multi-instrument 
studies are preferable to exclusive reliance on court records for some kinds of 
research questions. Second, the questionnaire did not ask respondents to identify 
the precise type of health care that they received, precluding a correlation of type 
of care and medical bill management for the full sample. 153 Third, the nature of 
the data collection ultimately required that we compare a continuous variable 
(Schedule F medical debt) with a categorical one (pre-bankruptcy out-of-pocket 
expenses) based on dollar ranges. The categories are the most precise measures 
available for out-of-pocket estimates for the full dataset. Fourth, the variables are 
drawn considerably from self-reported questionnaire data and thus face the same 
challenges as other interview and questionnaire studies. 154 But to emphasize, this 
limit applies to the court records as well. This is not a situation in which a debtor 
15 I. The same pattern holds for illness of self or partner as a reason for filing. Familial 
medical problems were noted as a cause of bankruptcy by a smaller group of filers, but show 
similar patterns: 25% of the group with the biggest gap between medical expenses and Schedule F 
medical debt selected familial medical problems as a reason for bankruptcy, compared to 10.7% of 
the sample population. A full breakdown of the distribution into these categories is available in 
Appendix F. 
152. For example, CSI Financial Services "takes over" a patient's account and offers extended 
payment plans, but the hospital takes back the debts upon a patient's default on a payment plan. 
Haugh, supra note 18, at 18. Neither CSI Financial Services nor the banks doing the interim 
financing would be detected as medical on Schedule F under most coding protocols. Some bulk 
medical debt buyers do not have medical-sounding names. See generally In re Andrews, 394 B.R. 
384 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008) (discussing bulk buyers in a different context). 
153. Diagnosis information was collected via telephone interview and thus is available only 
for the subset of respondents who participated in that portion of the study. 
154. Those who conduct research relying on interview and questionnaire data have long 
struggled with two principal issues. First, the nature of human response introduces a higher degree 
of error into the data. See John Bound, Charles Brown & Nancy Mathiowetz, Measurement Error 
in Survey Data, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS 3705 (2001). Second, asking questions about 
finances and health, two private topics, might introduce additional error. See Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 
91 AM. ECON. REv. 67, 68 (2001). In the context of our analysis, however, we believe that our 
findings contribute meaningfully to our understanding of an otherwise unexplained discrepancy. 
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says one thing while a court or creditor says another; in many consumer 
bankruptcy cases, nearly all of the documents in the court records are submitted 
by the debtor. Fifth, this study is designed to analyze bankruptcy filers. This 
means that we cannot directly comment on how non-filers deal with their medical 
bills. 155 Sixth, we compare court records and questionnaire data for a sample that 
was drawn in 2007, whereas the DOJ sample was collected in the early 2000s. 156 
We cannot prove, of course, that a survey conducted in the early 2000s on the 
sample captured by the DOJ would replicate our results. But, as Table I 
illustrates, our Schedule F data and the DOJ data (reported in Table 1) are 
similarly patterned. 
We also should take care to note some significant demographic patterns in 
expense and medical bill management that affect the accuracy of relying only on 
court records. 157 For example, homeowners and non-homeowners had equal 
frequency of identifiable Schedule F medical debt, as well as similar distributions 
across the dollar ranges of Schedule F medical debt. 158 But on the questionnaire, 
homeowners were more likely to report incurring expenses within the two years 
prior to filing (81 % versus 73 % ) and had a different distribution of expenses than 
non-homeowners. Homeowners also were more likely to report using credit 
cards-and, of course, home equity loans-for medical bills than non-
155. We see glimpses of a difference between the bankruptcy population and the general 
population. For example, in the tracking survey of the Center for Studying Health System Change, 
more than half of respondents who reported problems paying medical bills said that providers 
suggested that they undertake payment plans. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 3. Even among 
bankruptcy filers who identified medical bills as a reason for bankruptcy, only about a third 
reported being in payment plans directly with their providers; it is possible that providers suggested 
plans to more of them. We will discuss provider payment plans in more depth in a separate paper. 
156. See supra p. 265, tbl.1. Medical costs rose at a rate outpacing inflation generally in the 
2000s, and self-pay obligation did as well. Although our literature review focuses largely on more 
recent publications, we do not believe that medical practice management advice was qualitatively 
different in the first half of the decade. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 33. We do not know of a 
theory on which the enactment of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments would affect our results. 
157. We found few statistically significant differences in the average amount of Schedule F 
medical debt among those with differing education levels, gender, race, or living arrangements. We 
also tested for a variety of demographic differences in medical bill management-for instance, age, 
race, gender, homeownership, and marital status-and again many were not significant. For 
example, we did not find a significant difference in bill management between respondents who 
indicated that they lived with a permanent partner and those who lived alone. 
158. The homeownership variable includes everyone who reported owning a home within five 
years prior to filing. 
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homeowners. 159 A stand-alone analysis of the court records would blunt these 
differences. 
We encountered a similar phenomenon regarding medical expenses among 
petitioners who identified as African American versus petitioners who identified 
as white. 160 In our sample, there was not a statistically significant difference 
between African American petitioners and white petitioners in the frequency or 
average amount of Schedule F medical debt. 161 But on the questionnaire, African 
American petitioners reported lower levels of out-of-pocket medical expenses 
than most other petitioners, and African American petitioners with medical 
expenses were much less likely to use credit cards or home equity loans (but just 
as likely to use cash) for the bills they did incur. 162 African American petitioners 
159. Nearly three out often (27.9%) of those petitioners who owned a home in the five years 
prior to bankruptcy reported using a regular credit card to pay their medical bills, compared to 1 7 % 
of those who did not own a home. As previously noted, 5.8% of homeowners used a home equity 
loan to pay medical bills. Strangely, 1.2% of filers who said they did not own a home at any time in 
the prior five years selected this option on the questionnaire. It is possible that the language of the 
selection led them to believe that this option included lines of credit not secured by homes. Or, they 
may have used someone else's home as collateral. In any event, this difference, like the difference 
in credit card usage, is statistically significant to the <0.001 level. 
160. The written questionnaire asked respondents to indicate the group with which they 
identified, with the options of "African American or Black, Asian American, Hispanic or Latino/a, 
White or Caucasian, Other (please specify), or none." The questionnaire asked for the same 
information about partners of respondents. For the comparisons, we included in our measure 
African American respondents who reported no partner (57%) or identified his or her partner as 
African American (31 %), which is the great majority of the respondents who identified as African 
American. 
161. Among households with African American petitioners, 49.4% listed medical debt on 
Schedule F, compared to 52.6% of white filers. Households with African American petitioners 
listed smaller average medical debt ($5,688 per household) than did white filers ($6,513). But both 
of these differences are outside the standard levels for statistical significance. Households with 
African American petitioners, however, had a lower median Schedule F medical debt ($1,349) than 
white petitioners ($1,746), and this difference is significant to the 0.05 level. The DOJ report used 
averages, not medians, and thus would not have captured this difference. 
162. 76% of African American respondents reported using cash to pay medical bills, versus 
77% percent of white respondents, a difference that is not statistically significant. African 
American petitioners with medical expense were much less likely than white petitioners to report 
using a credit card to pay medical bills (11.3% versus 30.1 %). This difference persists when we 
examine the use of home equity loans to pay off medical expense (1. 7% versus 5.3%), and when 
we focus on only those who owned homes some time within the five years prior to filing (2.2% 
versus 6.9%). The difference in credit card and home equity loan use (including either 
measurement) is significant to the <0.001 level. 
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also had significantly less general credit card debt in their court files than other 
respondents. Looking at the patterns across the distribution of both measures of 
medical burden, it appears that African American petitioners in our sample were 
less likely than white petitioners to have reduced or eliminated medical bills 
owed directly to providers by the time they got to bankruptcy. We cannot control 
for the variables that might be driving this finding, such as differences in access 
to medical care and credit. 163 Whatever the explanation, Schedule F and the court 
record method are somewhat more (though not perfectly) reflective of the pre-
bankruptcy burdens of African American respondents in this sample than they 
are of the pre-bankruptcy burdens of white filers. 
A final example comes from the small group of youngest filers: households 
with at least one petitioner under twenty-five. The youngest filers reported 
having Schedule F medical debt with much greater frequency than any other age 
group or all other age groups combined. In addition, on average, households in 
which at least one of the filers was under twenty-five had an average medical 
debt on Schedule F of $13,263, compared to an average of $5,846 for all other 
age groups. 164 Yet, relying on this finding alone would overstate young filers' 
relative likelihood of having out-of-pocket medical expenses in the two years 
prior to filing, and may speak instead to their lack of financing options. These 
filers were less likely than other households to report using a regular credit card 
for medical bills and had less general credit card debt in their files overall. 165 
They were also more likely to report using a provider payment plan or doing 
163. As noted earlier, we tested for a variety of other differences based on race and sex 
relating to medical bills and medical bill management, and they were not significant. According to 
one prior study, African American families are three times as likely as white families to file for 
bankruptcy, but their reasons for filing are similar. See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: 
When Making It to the Middle Jsn 't Enough, 61 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1777, 1779 (2004). 
164. Although the youngest filers had a much higher average Schedule F medical debt than 
everyone else, the difference between the medians ($1,672 for the youngest versus $1,590 for the 
older filers) is not statistically significant, suggesting that a small number of the youngest filers 
with huge Schedule F medical debts skews the average. We see a glimpse of this in Figure l, where 
three out of the six filers with Schedule F medical debts over $100,000 were under the age of 
twenty-five. On a filer-by-filer basis, the very youngest respondents were also much more likely to 
have the same category of medical expense on both measures than everyone else (46% versus 
36%). 
165. Among households in which either petitioner was under twenty-five years old, 18.9% 
reported using credit cards for medical bills, compared to 24% of all other petitioners. This 
difference is not statistically significant. These youngest filers also had a lower frequency of home 
equity loan use for medical bills (2.1 % versus 4.2% for all other petitioners), but this difference is 
outside traditional levels for statistical significance. 
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"something else" about a medical bill, which often meant waiting to discharge 
the bill in bankruptcy. 166 Both of these latter options increase the likelihood of a 
pre-bankruptcy medical bill showing up as Schedule F medical debt. Likewise, a 
much greater proportion of bankrupt households with younger women petitioners 
(34 and younger) retained direct obligation that appeared as Schedule F medical 
debt than other groups. But such households were less likely to use a regular 
credit card or a home equity loan for medical bills and much more likely than 
others to use a provider payment plan or "something else" as compared to other 
households. 167 
These demographic observations warrant further study with additional 
controls. But this preliminary look reveals another layer of complexity that seems 
to be disregarded by those who rely exclusively on court records to measure 
medical debt burden. 
N. DISCUSSION 
This Article is the first to demonstrate through detailed systematic analysis 
that the DOJ's court record method, standing alone, is an unreliable measure of 
the financial burden of illness or injury faced by bankruptcy filers. In our 
nationally-representative sample of filers, the court record method produced a 
skewed undercount of medical bills and failed to account for filers with 
significant medical hardship who had no debt on Schedule F that could be 
identified as medical. The shifting of medical obligations to creditors with non-
medical identities played a large role in the discrepancy between court record and 
survey information, particularly for respondents with the largest verifiable gaps 
in measures. Absent changes to the forms on which information about debts is 
collected, the DOJ court record methodology should not be used to measure the 
financial burden of health care on bankrupt families. 
The demographic assessment suggests that court records better reflect 
medical bills for some groups of filers than for others. Yet court records, standing 
alone, are not well-suited to distinguish these filers on the relevant demographic 
166. Petitioners under twenty-five years of age with out-of-pocket expense reported provider 
payment plans 27.4% of the time, compared to all other petitioners, who reported payment plans 
22.8% of the time. 21 % of the younger petitioners reported doing "something else" to handle 
expenses, compared to 9.5% of all other petitioners. Both of these differences are statistically 
significant to the 0.005 level. 
167. Looking at the use of credit, the difference between the groups is significant to the 
<0.001 level using a standard ANOVA test. The difference in use of "something else" is also 
statistically significant to the <0.00 I level, while the difference in the use of cash is too small to be 
statistically significant. 
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criteria such as age and racial identity. Furthermore, lawmakers and scholars who 
have been relying on the DOJ court record study have made no public efforts to 
draw such distinctions. 
The clock cannot be turned back to 2005, when the DOJ analysis enabled 
lawmakers to vote with a clearer conscience in favor of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 and against amendments that 
members of Congress proposed to protect people with medical problems from 
certain harsher effects of the bill. 168 However, our study should guide the use and 
interpretation of these kinds of studies in other contexts. 
In combination with other methods, the court record method has 
unappreciated utility to shed light on the impact of patients' bankruptcies on 
providers. Consistent with the medical practice advice reviewed in Part II, health 
care consultants are concerned that "the last bill people pay is often their 
healthcare debt."169 One might have thought that families headed to bankruptcy 
court would overwhelmingly defer dealing with their medical bills. However, in 
our national sample, due to filers' payment and credit activities between the time 
of treatment and the time of bankruptcy, fewer bankruptcy filings directly 
affected medical providers, and for substantially smaller amounts. Nearly 80% of 
bankruptcy filers had received medical services or goods resulting in some self-
pay obligation within two years before they filed for bankruptcy-while many 
already were struggling financially. And yet despite their financial hardship, a 
third of filers with medical obligation had managed to protect their providers 
entirely from the bankruptcy process, and many others reduced the dollar amount 
of the obligation. 170 Some filers who reported the largest possible out-of-pocket 
168. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Cost of Sickness: Exploring the 
Intersections, 71 Mo. L. REv. 903, 908 n.21 (2006) (reviewing failed medical-related amendments 
to the 2005 Act). We recognize that the legislation as a whole had been pending in various forms 
since 1997, and lawmakers across the political spectrum were evidently responsive to credit 
industry pressure to enact it. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation 
Through the News Media, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1091, 1118 (2004). 
169. Robert Czerwinksi & Peter M. Friend, Selling Written-Off AIR, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., 
Sept. 2008, at 128, 130; see also A New World of Health Care: More Patients Seek Help with Bills, 
HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2008, at I (citing an industry 
expert saying, "As everyone knows, we are often the last bill people pay. I thought it was telling 
this past month when we heard people say they had to buy books, pay school fees, or pay for their 
kids' participation in sports so they could not pay the hospitals. Why? Other folks won't let you in 
without paying, but hospitals will."). 
170. In theory, preferential transfer law polices eve-of-bankruptcy payoffs of creditors, 
including medical providers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006); Cruse v. Hannibal Health Care Sys. 
(In re Watkins), 325 B.R. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2005) (applying preference law and ruling for 
287 
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS X:2 (2010) 
expenses within the two years prior to filing had no medical providers as 
creditors in the court records. Schedule F also includes debt older than two years, 
which increases the debt captured by the court record method. This suggests that 
our study is a fairly conservative measure of providers' reduction of exposure to 
their patients' bankruptcies within the two years prior to filing. Thus, a better 
way to use the court record method is combined with other sources to reveal the 
extent to which medical providers extricate themselves from the process and 
consequences of patients' bankruptcies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regardless of whether they are insured, nearly all patients have direct 
monetary dealings with their medical providers. A body of advice and 
technological tools help providers manage risks associated with this financial 
exposure. The advice and tools encourage the use of third-party credit. Our study 
demonstrates how these practices affect the empirical study of medical burden on 
patients. In our sample, an exclusively court record study does not merely 
produce a more conservative measure of medical burden; it hides or diminishes 
cases in which medical bills were particularly significant. 
The health care finance debate intensified the interest in medical bills among 
financially distressed families such as those found in the bankruptcy system, and 
the interest in this subject will not subside anytime soon. Our study urges caution 
in using the DOJ court record analysis or other such studies to measure patient 
medical debt on a standalone basis. It also casts doubt on efforts to refute survey 
studies based on court documents alone. Absent changes to the forms on which 
filers report their debts, or, perhaps, substantial changes in medical bill 
trustee to recover execution on bond for payment of medical bills subject to state court judgment). 
Although the law is not uniform, some courts find that a creditor is vulnerable to preference attack 
even if the debtor simply substitutes another creditor (for example, a credit card or credit card 
convenience check) to pay the antecedent debt. See, e.g., In re Marshall, 550 F .3d 1251 ( l 0th Cir. 
2008); In re Wells, 382 B.R. 355 (6th Cir. BAP 2008); Flatau v. Walman Optical Co. (In re 
Werner), 365 B.R. 283 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007). But for a variety of legal and practical reasons, 
preference law is unlikely to have an effect on medical bill payment pre-filing in most consumer 
bankruptcy cases. First, the preference period is relatively short (ninety days, as mentioned) unless 
the beneficiary is an insider. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (2006) (setting 90-day preference period 
generally and one year look-back period for insiders). Second, recipients of transfers of value less 
than $600 have an absolute statutory defense to preference actions in consumer bankruptcy cases, 
and thus case trustees would not pursue such cases. § 547(c)(8). Third, providers have a defense if 
they accepted payment in the ordinary course of business, which Congress in 2005 defined broadly 
to protect more payment recipients.§ 547(c)(2). 
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management, court records alone reveal very little about the burden of medical 
bills on financially distressed families. At best, when used in combination with 
other instruments, such records help to shed light on the impact of patient 
bankruptcy on health care providers-an important but distinct matter. 
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN QUESTIONNAIRE-REPORTED 
OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENSES AND SCHEDULE F MEDICAL DEBT 
Number Percent 
Four categories more on Schedule F than on the questionnaire (-4) 19 0.78 
Three categories more on Schedule F than on the questionnaire (-3) 26 1.07 
Two categories more on Schedule F than on the questionnaire (-2) 96 3.93 
One categories more on Schedule F than on the questionnaire ( -1) 224 9.18 
Same category of medical debt on Schedule F and the 834 34.18 
questionnaire (0) 
One category more on the questionnaire than on Schedule F ( + 1) 584 23.93 
Two categories more on the questionnaire than on Schedule F (+2) 373 15.29 
Three categories more on questionnaire than on Schedule F (+3) 79 3.24 
Four categories more on the questionnaire than on Schedule F (+4) 36 1.48 
Missing either questionnaire or Schedule F data 169 6.93 
(excluded from analysis) 
Total 2440 100 
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MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS 
APPENDIX D: DEFINITE CREDIT CARD DEBT REPORTED ON SCHEDULE F, BY GAP IN 
MEASURES 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
-4 $15,148.75 
(24950.728) 
-3 $14,518.50 
(25589.335) 
-2 $9,754.48 
( 16860.425) 
-1 $13,457.91 
(20811.045) 
0 $15,075.98 
(22072.988) 
+l $19,892.82 
(26959.325) 
+2 $27,334.37 
(34652.081) 
+3 $28,890.91 
(32613.587) 
+4 $34,523.00 
(27361.75) 
Total $18,837.03 
(27361.75) 
Prob> F 0.0000 
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APPENDIX E: CREDIT CARDS To MAKE ENDS MEET, BY GAP IN MEASURES 
Put necessities on the credit card Consolidated debts with a 
(for example, food, or monthly bills) credit card or new loan 
Percent Percent 
(standard deviation) (standard deviation) 
-4 47.4% 36.8% 
(0.513) (0.496) 
-3 42.3% 15.4% 
(0.504) (0.368) 
-2 40.6% 17.7% 
(0.494) (0.384) 
-1 40.2% 25.0% 
(0.491) (0.434) 
0 52.3% 31.4% 
(0.5) (0.464) 
+I 56.5% 37.3% 
(0.496) (0.484) 
+2 65.7% 46.1% 
(0.475) (0.499) 
+3 64.6% 43.0% 
(0.481) (0.498) 
+4 75.0% 47.2% 
(0.439) (0.506) 
Total 54.5% 34.7% 
(0.498) (0.476) 
Prob> F 0.0000 0.0000 
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MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS 
APPENDIX F: MEDICAL REASONS FOR FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY, BY GAP IN 
MEASURES 
Medical or health Medical problems Medical problems of 
care bills, experienced by you or other family members 
including your spouse or partner (such as children or 
prescription parents) 
medications 
Percent Percent Percent 
(standard deviation) (standard deviation) (standard deviation) 
-4 21.1% 26.3% 5.3% 
(0.419) (0.452) (0.229) 
-3 26.9% 30.8% 3.8% 
(0.452) (0.471) (0.196) 
-2 22.9% 29.2% 8.3% 
(0.423) (0.457) (0.278) 
-1 25.0% 28.6% 8.9% 
(0.434) (0.453) (0.286) 
0 27.9% 28.9% 9.0% 
(0.449) (0.454) (0.286) 
+l 25.2% 31.0% 10.6% 
(0.434) (0.463) (0.308) 
+2 32.4% 36.5% 13.1% 
(0.469) (0.482) (0.338) 
+3 53.2% 46.8% 24.1% 
Z{0.502) (0.502) (0.43) 
+4 66.7% 66.7% 25.0% 
(0.478) (0.478) (0.439) 
Total 28.9% 31.9% 10.7% 
(0.453) (0.466) (0.31) 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
>F 
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